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RECOLLECTIONS,

&c. &c.

VOLUME II.

RECOLLECTIONS

AND

REFLECTIONS,

PERSONAL AND POLITICAL,

AS CONNECTED WITH

Public Affairs,

23577

DURING THE

REIGN OF GEORGE III.

By JOHN NICHOLLS, Esq.

MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN THE FIFTEENTH, SIXTEENTH, AND EIGHTEENTH PARLIAMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

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RECOLLECTIONS,

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WHEN I determined to offer to the public my Recollections of the principal circumstances which had occurred during the reign of George III., it was my intention to preserve materials for the use of some future historian; but in stating the facts, and my reflections on the same, I have often found it difficult to make myself fully understood, in consequence of my having confined myself to the period of the reign of George III.; many of the events of that reign being attributable to circumstances which had occurred during the preceding reign. I have therefore determined to carry back my Recollections and Reflections to the latter

years of Sir Robert Walpole's administration.

Frederick Prince of Wales married the Princess Augusta of Saxe Gotha, in April, 1736. His father had assigned to him, out of the Civil List, 50,000*l.* a year, in addition to the revenues of the duchy of Cornwall, which amounted to about 15,000*l.* a year more. Although the Prince accepted this appanage on his marriage, yet he soon found that this income would be inadequate to the maintenance of his household, in the manner in which he wished to live. His father, while Prince of Wales, had received 100,000*l.* a year from George I., in addition to the revenues of the duchy of Cornwall. Prince Frederick thought himself entitled to the same allowance; and, with the assistance of the opposition, he endeavoured to compel the King to make him an additional grant, out of the Civil List, of 50,000*l.* a year. The motion failed in the House of Commons, although much exertion seems to have been made in support of his demand; two hundred and four members having voted for the address to

the King, while only two hundred and thirty-four could be brought to vote against it: and we are told by Mr. Dodington (who, on this occasion, resisted all applications from the Prince), that forty-five members of the opposition declined giving any vote on the subject. A similar motion in the House of Lords was equally unsuccessful. Frederick Prince of Wales had never possessed in any great degree the affection either of the King or of the Queen; but hostilities having been declared by this measure, the Prince put himself openly at the head of the opposition; and in Feb. 1742, Sir Robert Walpole was obliged to resign the office of prime minister. In my former Recollections and Reflections, I have declined giving the character of Sir Robert Walpole. Those who have transmitted to us his character have, for the most part, been his enemies; and we are perhaps, from this circumstance, led to think less favourably of him than he deserves. The great object of his administration was to preserve the Brunswick Family on the throne; and by that means to protect us from the establishment of popery

and despotism. The means which he employed were to maintain peace abroad, and to increase the power of the Whig party by the influence of corruption at home. His efforts succeeded; and although the bigotry of the Stuarts certainly contributed to facilitate the views of Sir Robert Walpole, yet I think we are indebted to him for having preserved to us the Brunswick dynasty. Perhaps I may be thought to have expressed myself too strongly. I speak from what I have heard from old men in the early part of my life. To preserve the Protestant religion was the first wish of the nation. But if people could have been convinced that the Protestant religion was secure, there certainly was much partiality to the Stuart family. As the race of the Stuarts is extinct, and all remembrance of them is now lost, there can be no impropriety in stating this opinion as a historian. Sir Robert Walpole certainly was not a great statesman, and his system gradually diminished the energetic character of the British nation. But he was loyal and useful to that Brunswick family which he served. About the year 1737 great complaints were brought

forward by the merchants, both in Jamaica and at home, respecting the violences committed by the Spanish *Guarda Costas* on such British ships as approached the coast of Spanish America. The English claimed the right of cutting logwood on the Spanish territories adjoining the bay of Honduras. They founded this claim on an article of *uti possidetis* in a treaty made with the Court of Spain in 1672. The English admitted that the Spaniards were the proprietors of the soil; but they contended that the inhabitants of Jamaica had been accustomed to cut logwood in the country antecedently to the treaty of 1672; and this assertion was probably well founded; for when the bucaniers of Jamaica were restrained from practising piracy, they betook themselves to cutting logwood on the Spanish territory. But what would an English gentleman say of a right claimed by the inhabitants of an adjoining town to pilfer his woods, because they had always been in the practice of it? Would he admit that such a usage gave a right of possession? on this usage, coupled with the clause of *uti possidetis* in the treaty, the English grounded their right.

These logwood cutters also carried on another trade, that of smuggling. The profit derived from sending British manufactures to Spanish America, and receiving in exchange gold and silver, was so advantageous, both to the Spaniards and to the English, that no vigilance of the Spanish government could prevent it. The British merchants complained of the seizure of their property by the Spaniards; and about the year 1738, a man of the name of Jenkins was exhibited at the bar of the House of Commons, and told them that his ears had been cut off by order of the captain of a Spanish *Guarda Costa.* He was asked, what he said on the occasion: he replied, that, expecting immediate death, he recommended his soul to God, and his cause to his country. The House was thrown into a flame; and the influence of government could not prevent the whole nation from taking part with Captain Jenkins.

It is generally believed that Captain Jenkins was a professed smuggler; and it has been even doubted whether his ears ever had been cut off. A member proposed,

that he should take off his wig, and show how his ears had been mutilated. But this proposal was received with horror by the opposition. They asked, if gentlemen wished to add to the wrongs suffered by Captain Jenkins, in thus subjecting him to the humiliation of exposing his disfigured person to public view? A war with Spain and the fall of Sir Robert Walpole were ultimately the consequences of the ferment excited in the nation by these complaints of the merchants. The removal of Sir Robert Walpole in February 1742 was not attended by any circumstances beneficial to the country. The leaders of the opposition were soon divided; each man being influenced by the hope of obtaining his own private views; and after much intrigue and cabal, Henry Pelham, and his brother, the Duke of Newcastle, remained the ministers; the first being placed at the head of the Treasury, and the second being made Secretary of State. The war which had been begun with Spain, soon involved us in a continental war with France. It was feebly conducted by the Pelhams, and terminated

without wisdom by the peace of *Aix la Chapelle.*

Mr. Henry Pelham died in the year 1754. We have his character given us in the Memoirs of Mr. Glover. Mr. Glover was the author of several poetical compositions. He had published an epic poem, called "Leonidas," as well as some tragedies, two of which were called "Medea" and "Boadicea." From the epic poem, he was generally distinguished by the name of "Leonidas Glover." He was a very indifferent poet, and his poetry has passed into oblivion; but he possessed very considerable knowledge on commercial subjects. He was employed by the merchants, in 1741-2, at the bar of the House of Commons, in support of their complaints of the depredations committed by the Spaniards; and afterwards, in 1775, by those British merchants who carried on commerce with our American colonies. On both occasions he displayed great knowledge and abilities. During the life of Frederick Prince of Wales, he had been an attendant at Leicester House; and after the death of the

Prince he seems always to have kept up his connection with that court. His "Memoirs" have been published since his death. The characters which he has given us of the principal political actors of that period, seem to have been drawn correctly; and I believe that the accounts of those transactions to which he was privy, are related with truth. His character of Mr. Henry Pelham is in the following words: "In August, 1754, Mr. Henry Pelham died. He was originally an officer in the army, and a professed gamester; of a narrow mind and low parts; of an affable dissimulation, and a plausible cunning; false to Sir Robert Walpole, who raised him, and ungrateful to the Earl of Bath, who protected him. By long experience and attendance, he became considerable as a parliament-man: and even when minister, divided his time to the last between his office and the club of gamesters at White's."

This character certainly does not give us a high opinion of Mr. Pelham as a statesman; although when it is compared with the character of his elder brother, the Duke

of Newcastle, we are almost induced to think of Mr. Pelham with respect. Mr. Glover gives us the character of the Duke of Newcastle in the following terms:—

"The Duke of Newcastle was a man of whom no one ever spoke with cordial regard: of parts and conduct which generally drew animadversions bordering on contempt; of notorious insincerity, political cowardice, and servility to the highest and the lowest; yet insincere without gall, ambitious without pride; luxurious, jovial, hospitable to all men; of an exorbitant estate; affable, forgetful of offences, and profuse of his favours, indiscriminately to all his adherents. He had established a faction, by far the most powerful in this country: hence he derived that influence which encouraged his unworthy pretensions to ministerial power; nor was he less indebted to his experience of a court, and long practice in all its craft; whence he had acquired a certain art of imposition, that in every negotiation with the most distinguished popular leaders, however superior to himself in understanding, from the

instant they began to depart from ingenuous and public principles, he never missed his advantage, nor failed of making them his property at last, and himself their master. Lord Cobham, Chesterfield, the Duke of Bedford, Pitt, and others, found him so in 1743, when he took them into his confederacy to rout the Earls of Bath and Granville. Pitt found him so in 1757, when this new coalition was formed to destroy the Duke of Cumberland and Fox."

I will here subjoin the character which Mr. Glover has given us of George II. "A weak, narrow-minded, sordid, and unfeeling master; who, seated by fortune on a throne, was calculated by nature for a pawnbroker's shop; and was easily reconciled to a set of men, willing and able to gratify his low avarice; in his ideas, a sufficient compensation for the sacrifice he made to them of his resentments and his prerogative. Hating Mr. Pitt, he preferred him: the ministers (the Pelhams) who had hurled back his favours in his face, he restored not only to employment, but to his

confidence, and the sole power of three kingdoms."

From the death of Mr. Pelham to the coalition which took place between the Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Pitt, in the summer 1757, public affairs were conducted most wretchedly. But the only matter of astonishment is, how, with such a King and such a minister, public business could go on at all. Bubb Dodington's Diary corroborates every thing which we find in the Memoirs of Mr. Glover, and I think we may fairly trust to this gentleman's Diary. From the despicable character which he has given of himself, he does not seem ever to have thought of practising concealment.

The character which Mr. Glover has given us of Mr. Dodington, fully confirms every impression which we receive from that gentleman's own Diary.

"I met Mr. Pitt at Mr. Dodington's; the Grenvilles, his (Dodington's) relations, whom I had long known full of family dis-

gusts against him, now repaired to his house after an interval of many years; and had his nature been capable of consistency, and common prudence directed his only pursuit, a profitable place, he might, with their support and foundation, his own social accomplishments, wit, plausibility, literature, and long experience in the forms of public business, have stood an eminent character in times like these, so destitute of great men. All these qualifications, with the addition of elegance, magnificence, and wealth; wanting judgment and discretion, could not protect his old age from ridicule and neglect; so necessary is firmness and uniformity of conduct to procure, even from the imperfect part of mankind, the confidence requisite to maintain the unworthy pre-eminence among them.

"Among the last of his friends who did not desert him, I count myself. Public connexions first made our acquaintance; I was well apprised of his temper and character; therefore was never deceived by him. Won by his private good qualities, friendship beyond professions, industry and ala-

crity to serve and oblige, I always kept up my intimacy, and had really more weight with him than any other man had; though less than the least of his own interested projects. I was continually with him all that summer (1755); Fox was there frequently, and seemed anxious for Dodington's opinion and advice. I soon perceived the latter trimming between Pitt and Fox; though assuring me that he would unite with no cabal, but stand on his own bottom, and publicly declare his sentiments unbiassed. This I encouraged, wishing sincerely well to a man whose company gave me pleasure.

"When the Hessian treaty was made known (that apparent job), and the spirited behaviour of Legge, it at once struck out a plan of opposition. Dodington was among the foremost; Pitt depended much upon him, and was even deluded by Fox; not indeed from any promise, but indications that he would take part with them on the Hessian treaty. Certain it is, that hopes were entertained of Fox's concurrence in the plan to overthrow the Duke of New-

castle, and that the opposition was to take its rise from both the foreign treaties, (viz. the Hessian and the Russian). It is as certain that the Duke of Newcastle considered Fox as a secret enemy. Fox by amusing Pitt, provoked him beyond reconciliation; and by endeavouring to supplant Newcastle, he frightened him into a diffidence as hurtful to Fox as Pitt's resentment.

"The opening of the session was now at hand; Charles Townshend, from the mere pleasure of fishing in troubled waters, enlists under Pitt; the country gentlemen and the public add their weight; in the midst of all, Fox quits his place as Secretary at War, and on the 14th of November (1755), accepts the Secretaryship of State. As Pitt had for some time past rejected any compromise with the court on the conditions they proposed, and consequently a resignation of employments, or displacing him and his friends, was expected. Fox holds up these alluring objects to Dodington.—He melts at once; passes a few harmless censures on the Hessian treaty when it was debated in the House; makes his court in

the same breath to Hanover; shortly after steps into the Treasurership of the Navy, just vacated by his relation and new confederate George Grenville; is marked for perdition by that party, and becomes despised by every other beyond all redemption of character or weight with the lowest faction. I gave him a cold congratulation, having warned him before, that he could get into no office at that juncture without being the most unhappy of men."

The treaty of Aix La Chapelle left many questions respecting the rights of France and England wholly unsettled. There seems to have been very little attention to the fixing the limits between the two crowns in North America. The sea gave a line of demarcation to the east of our possessions; but no care was taken to fix any boundary to the westward.

The English had entered the country from the eastward. Their object was colonization, with a view to agriculture. The French had entered North America by the way of Quebec and New Orleans; and they

seem always to have been more desirous to carry on traffic with the Indians, than to fix themselves as agriculturists. By what principles the boundaries of their several possessions were to be ascertained, was a very difficult question; and at the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, the subject seems to have been very little thought of. After the completion of this treaty, and previously to the death of Mr. Pelham, some merchants of London, in conjunction with some planters of Virginia, had obtained from the British government a grant of a large tract of land, situated between what had been usually considered as the limit of Virginia and the river Ohio. The proprietors of this grant made some settlements on the land. The French remonstrated, and removed the settlers, but without violence; no blood was shed. The French, however, built a small fort to ascertain and protect their right. Those who were interested in the new grant attacked and destroyed the fort; and in the execution of this measure killed about thirty Frenchmen. Thus began the contest. The London merchants and the planters of Virginia, interested in

supporting the new grant, were loud in their complaints. It does not seem as if it ever occurred to make any enquiry, whether the British government had the right to grant this land; still less was there any examination, whether it was for the interest of Great Britain, that the boundaries of Virginia should be thus extended to the westward. But in compliance with the clamours of those merchants and planters who were interested in the subject, it was assumed as an undoubted truth, that the British government had a right to make the grant, and that the possession of the land in question was of infinite importance to the British nation. Most certainly it was a question which might have admitted of discussion between the two courts; and the pacific character of Louis XV. afforded to the British minister a prospect of terminating the dispute without a war. The whole of Louis XV.'s life had sufficiently shown that he had no propensity to military enterprize; nor was he led by vanity, like his predecessor Louis XIV., to the parade and affectation of military glory. Indolent and sensual, Louis XV. desired

nothing but personal gratification. Such a disposition in the monarch must have afforded the Duke of Newcastle much advantage in negotiation; but these circumstances were overlooked by the British minister. He sincerely wished for peace, for he must have been conscious of his own incapacity as a war minister; but he commenced unjustifiable hostilities. In the autumn, 1754, he sent General Braddock with a military force to Virginia; and in the ensuing summer, without declaring war, he seized the French fishing vessels on the banks of Newfoundland. The French exclaimed against this as an outrageous violation of the law of nations, which it certainly was. I have heard Frenchmen, when mentioning this transaction, and speaking of it as a violation of the law of nations, add, at the same time, that it was a master-stroke of policy; for that by seizing the sailors in their Newfoundland ships, the British minister had crippled the future operations of their navy. But this was not the motive which had actuated the Duke of Newcastle: he had seized their ships, not with a view to cripple the French

navy; but that he might have something to urge in answer to the clamours of those gentlemen in the opposition, who were loudly abusing him in the House of Commons for his helpless imbecility. George II. was as desirous of peace as his minister. A naval war, or military operations in America, could have afforded him no gratification. But the people wished for war.

The feeble mind of the Duke of Newcastle induced him to adopt another measure equally unjust, and more cruel. That part of Nova Scotia which had been settled by the French, had at the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle been ceded to Great Britain, under the name of L'Acadie. The inhabitants were become British subjects; and as such, were entitled to the protection of the British government. But the pusillanimous mind of the Duke of Newcastle led him to believe, that in case of a war, these inhabitants would declare for France; so they gave them the name of French Neutrals, and removed them all to England, where, I believe, they soon perished from misery and want. The French remonstrated against these acts of injustice,

but they did not retaliate. They employed themselves in preparing a navy, and industriously spread a report that they would invade England. Frightened at this threat of an invasion, the pusillanimity of the Duke of Newcastle induced him, about the end of the year 1755, or the beginning of the year 1756, to introduce a large body of Hessians and Hanoverians into England, for the defence of the country. These were the principal transactions of 1755, during the whole of which year there was no declaration of war.

The French detached ships of war and land forces to their several foreign colonies. To Quebec, to Louisburgh, to St. Domingo, and Martinico; and early in the spring, 1756, disembarked eleven thousand men in the Island of Minorca, for the purpose of besieging St. Philip's Castle. Although most certain intelligence had been sent to the British ministers of the intended attack on Minorca, many months before the landing in that island took place, and that the French forces would be covered by a fleet of twelve sail of the line, yet such was

the pusillanimous apprehension of the British ministers, that the French would put their threats of invasion into execution, that only ten sail of the line, known to be inferior in dimensions to the French ships, and unaccompanied by frigates, were sent at a late season, under the command of Admiral Byng, to the relief of Minorca; although, if the ministers had not been deterred by the threatened invasion, they might at that time have sent double this force. The English Admiral had the good fortune to be joined by three ships of the line of small dimensions; viz. a sixty-gun ship, and two of fifty guns, and also by four frigates, which had effected their escape from Minorca. This was a reinforcement which could not have been relied on; yet even with this, Admiral Byng's fleet was inferior to that of the French Admiral La Galissionère, which consisted of twelve sail of the line and five large frigates. An action ensued, but the result did not incapacitate La Galissionère from protecting the land forces, which carried on the siege of St. Philip's Castle. Admiral Byng had carried with him orders to General Fowke, the

Governor of Gibraltar, to put seven hundred soldiers of his garrison on board the fleet, *if he could spare them.* The Governor very naturally answered, "If the town should be attacked by the Spaniards, which there is reason to expect, I shall have occasion for these soldiers, I therefore cannot spare them." For this conduct, the ministers had sufficient influence to procure General Fowke to be broke by a court martial. This, undoubtedly, was an act of injustice. He was governor of Gibraltar, responsible for its security; and when they left it to his judgment to say, if these soldiers could be spared or not, whether he decided judiciously or injudiciously, he certainly did not merit punishment. But the conduct of ministers towards Admiral Byng was infinitely more unjust. Much money was expended by them in ballads, publications, &c. &c. to excite the people to believe that Admiral Byng had failed from cowardice. The effects produced by these efforts of the ministers are thus described by Mr. Glover. "Those who did not live at this period, cannot by any description conceive the excess of national resentment and rage against

that commander, which was artfully and industriously fomented by a culpable administration, that to his cowardice, singly, the disgrace of our arms might be charged, together with the loss of Minorca, which, after a very indifferent defence, surrendered to Richelieu on the 29th of June. Unheard, and untried, Byng was immediately devoted to destruction by king, ministry, and people. The proceedings on his trial, sentence, and death, form a memorable æra." Although at that time I was only a boy in my twelfth year, yet I can well remember the universal clamour of every description of people against Admiral Byng. Mr. Glover speaks of the indifferent defence made by the governor of Minorca. I recollect a letter alluding to this circumstance, which drew much attention from the public: it was addressed, with the name of the author, to the editor of a newspaper, and in the following words: "Sir, I was a lieutenant in 1708, when General Stanhope was made a lord for having taken Minorca. Sir, I was a lieutenant in 1756, when General Blakeney was made a lord for having lost Minorca. Sir, I am a lieutenant still."

Admiral Byng was tried by a court martial under the 12th Article of War, which runs thus: "Every person in the fleet, who, through cowardice, negligence, or disaffection, shall in time of action withdraw, or keep back, or not come into the fight or engagement, or shall not do his utmost to engage, take or destroy every ship which it shall be his duty to engage, and to assist and relieve all and every one of His Majesty's ships, or those of his allies, which it shall be his duty to assist and relieve, every such person so offending, and being convicted thereof by the sentence of a court martial, shall suffer death." The court martial declared that Admiral Byng had not failed from cowardice, nor from disaffection, nor did they accuse him of negligence; but found that he had not done his utmost to destroy the enemy's ships. They therefore pronounced him guilty under part of the 12th Article of War, in not having done his utmost to destroy the enemy's ships, and for this omission sentenced him to be shot, but unanimously recommended him to the King's mercy. Common sense must point out to every man, that to constitute

guilt under this Article of War, there must in the naval officer have been an omission to do his utmost either from cowardice, or disaffection, or negligence; and that the omission to do his utmost to destroy the enemy's ships, where such omission does not arise from one of these motives, does not amount to a crime within this Article of War. But it suited the ministers that Byng should be shot. Notwithstanding the recommendation to mercy by the court martial, the King immediately signed a warrant for his execution. Earl Temple, who had been made First Lord of the Admiralty on the removal of Lord Anson, towards the close of the year 1756, and the other commissioners of the Admiralty, refused to countersign the warrant. This occasioned some delay; but the ex-ministers ultimately prevailed, and Admiral Byng was shot to shelter a culpable administration.

It would be presumption in me to offer any opinion as to the plan which Admiral Byng had adopted for attacking the fleet of M. de la Galissionère. The French fleet lay to, expecting our attack. Admiral

Byng proposed to go down in a slanting line for the purpose of preventing his ships from being raked. Admiral West disobeyed these orders, and went down in a straight line. Several ships of his division were raked and disabled; from which circumstance, the continuance of the attack was no longer practicable. Admiral Vernon publicly declared, that the mode of attack proposed by Admiral Byng was judicious, and that it failed through the disobedience of Admiral West.

I cannot refrain from remarking, in this place, the great difference in the management of public affairs, where the Prime Minister is incapable, and where he is a man of abilities. I believe that Lord Anson was a very able minister of the marine. After his death, I recollect hearing the late Earl of Chatham say of him in the House of Lords, on the Falkland Island debate, that he was as able a first Lord of the Admiralty as had ever been placed in that station; and I believe that the Earl of Chatham spoke the truth. Under the direction of the energetic mind of the Earl

of Chatham, Lord Anson acted with an ability which had never beeu surpassed; but while he was the subaltern of the Duke of Newcastle, he was infected with the imbecility of his helpless commander.

Since the above reflection was committed to paper, the public has been favoured with the memoirs of the late Earl Waldegrave; and I am led by the perusal of this work to throw together some further observations on the various circumstances which occurred from the death of Mr. Pelham in 1754 to the coalition between the Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Pitt in the summer, 1757. I have extracted the character of Mr. Pelham from the work of Mr. Glover. The Earl Waldegrave has spoken of Mr. Pelham in very different terms. I have no doubt that both those gentlemen have given us their real opinions; but Mr. Glover was attached to Leicester House; while the Earl Waldegrave was devoted to George II. Our opinions are influenced by our affections and aversions; we are not therefore to be surprised at the different manner in which this minister is

described by the two writers. If I may be allowed to add my own sentiments on the subject, I should say, that I am more disposed to think the Earl Waldegrave's a true likeness, than that given us by Mr. Glover. I do not think that Mr. Pelham was a great minister, but he was an honest man, and possessed the confidence of the country; and when we reflect on the misfortunes brought on us by his successor the Duke of Newcastle, we can hardly refrain from saying, that Mr. Pelham's death was a national calamity.

On the death of Mr. Pelham, the Duke of Newcastle was appointed first Lord of the Treasury. He seems immediately to have conceived an idea, more absurd, and more impracticable, than one would imagine could possibly have been entertained by a man who, like himself, had been for so many years conversant in the nature of the British government. He seems to have thought, that he could be not only the *Prime* Minister, but the *Sole* Minister, and that he could guide the House of Commons by his subalterns and lieutenants.

At the death of Mr. Pelham, Mr. Pitt was Paymaster of the Army, and Mr. Fox Secretary at War. They had been able supporters of the late minister, and while that gentleman lived, they had never claimed the rank of cabinet ministers, or to have any direct and personal intercourse with the King. But on the death of Mr. Pelham, the case was altered. Whoever was to conduct the business of the House of Commons on the part of government had a right to say, "As I am to be responsible for the measures brought forward, I must be a cabinet minister, and be permitted to have direct intercourse with my sovereign." The Duke of Newcastle's jealousy revolted at this demand. He wished that these gentlemen should remain as subalterns, communicating with the King only through himself. The Duke seems first to have proposed his plan to Mr. Pitt. It was received with indignation and contempt. He was equally unfortunate in his application to Mr. Fox. With this latter gentleman, he negotiated through the Marquis of Hartington; and it appears that they had come to an agreement; but when Mr. Fox demanded per-

mission to exercise those powers which the Duke of Newcastle had consented to allow him, the Duke's jealousy revived: he said he had been misunderstood, and the negotiation terminated unsuccessfully. The Duke of Newcastle then appointed Sir Thomas Robinson Secretary of State. This gentleman consented to act agreeably to the wishes of the minister. He had served in a diplomatic character in Germany; and having in that situation acquired some knowledge of the views of the different German princes, was from this circumstance acceptable to the King. But he was wholly unequal to the conduct of public business in the House of Commons.

Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox did not resign their employments. They supported the measures of government, but lost no opportunity of exposing the Duke of Newcastle to ridicule and contempt. Thus passed that session of Parliament which had commenced in the autumn, 1754.

I have mentioned in the preceding reflection the grant of land improvidently

and inconsiderately made by Mr. Pelham to certain merchants of London, and planters in Virginia: the attempt to make settlements under this grant was resisted by the French. As neither the King of France, nor the King of Great Britain, nor his minister, wished for war, there is every reason to believe that the matter might have been accommodated by a negotiation; but to protect himself against abuse in the House of Commons, the minister decided to send an armament to Virginia under General Braddock. If an augmentation of force only in that country had been his object, he might have sent this force at intervals, and without much notice; but this would not have answered the minister's views: his object was a defence against the clamours of the Opposition in Parliament; he therefore sent out the armament with all possible parade; thus pacific negotiation was abandoned, and hostile measures were adopted. I have noticed the removal of the French neutrals from Nova Scotia, and the seizure of the French vessels in the summer, 1755: all these proceedings flowed from the same

source, I mean the Duke of Newcastle's incapacity, and his pusillanimous apprehensions of the opposition in Parliament.

Before the opening of the ensuing session in 1755, the Duke of Newcastle was brought to see the impracticability of that plan which he had formed of being the sole minister. He, therefore, came to an agreement with Mr. Fox, who was appointed Secretary of State and a Cabinet minister in the room of Sir Thomas Robinson. In consequence of this appointment, Mr. Pitt and his friends resigned their employments. Before Mr. Fox had closed with the Duke of Newcastle, he had given Mr. Pitt reason to believe that he would concur with him in the ensuing session of 1755, in forming an opposition to the Duke of Newcastle's measures. There is no just ground for saying, that Mr. Fox was guilty of any deception towards Mr. Pitt; but the latter gentleman had entertained the expectation that he should be joined by Mr. Fox, and the disappointment seems to have left in his breast an implacable resentment.

Before I proceed to relate the occurrences which took place in 1755 and 1756, it may be proper to state the views and characters of the principal political personages.

From the death of Frederick, Prince of Wales, to the summer 1755, the Princess Dowager seems to have acted with great discretion. She took very little part in public affairs: she behaved with great respect towards the King; and although she continued to entertain that jealousy of the Duke of Cumberland, which had rankled in the mind of her husband, yet it was kept smothered, and on no occasion had produced any explosion. Her predominant wish was to retain the entire possession of her eldest son, with a view, that, at his accession, she might govern in his name. The Earl Waldegrave, who, on the removal of Lord Harcourt, had been appointed governor to the Prince by George II., tells us that he found the young Prince had been educated in the nursery, among bed-chamber women, and pages of the back-stairs;

that it was impracticable to alter in any great degree this plan of education; and that the only line of conduct which remained for himself, was to endeavour gradually to expand his young pupil's mind, as far as was consistent with that system of education which had been adopted by his mother. George II., on the death of his son, had incautiously, and most indiscreetly, left the management of his grandson entirely in the hands of the Princess. Perhaps he thought it would have appeared harsh to deprive the mother of the society of her son, immediately after the loss which she had sustained by the death of her husband; and, as he was known to have lived on bad terms with his son, he was the more desirous of avoiding this imputation. Possibly he was not aware of the consequences which might ensue from his grandson being thus left under his mother's management; but from whatever cause it arose, the King does not appear to have interfered with the arrangements of Leicester House.

The Earl Waldegrave's character of the Princess Dowager of Wales is in the follow-

ing terms. "The Princess of Wales was reputed a woman of excellent sense by those who knew her very imperfectly; but, in fact, was one of those moderate geniuses, who, with much natural dissimulation, a civil address, an assenting conversation, and few ideas of their own, can act with tolerable propriety as long as they are conducted by wise and prudent counsellors. She retained all the jealousy which divided the Royal Family during the life of the Prince her husband, dreading the power of the Duke of Cumberland, and hating him as much as she feared him. During the life of the Prince her husband, she had distinguished herself by a most decent and prudent behaviour; and the King, notwithstanding his aversion to his son, behaved to her not only with great politeness, but with the appearance of cordiality and affection. When the Prince died, His Majesty gave still stronger proofs of his favour and confidence; he patronized the act by which she was appointed Regent, in case of a minority; and, what was of greater importance, he suffered the heir apparent to remain under her sole direction. For though preceptors and go-

vernors were chosen by the King, or rather by his ministers, they had only the shadow of authority; and the two principal, the Earl Harcourt and the Bishop of Norwich, were soon disgraced, because they attempted to form an interest independent of the mother, and presumed, on some occasions, to have an opinion of their own. In the mean time, the Princess's behaviour to the King was wise and dutiful: she considered him as her protector, benefactor, and friend, and took no step of any consequence without his approbation. In a word, His Majesty's tenderness for the Princess and her family, and the Princess's duty and obedience to the King, were equally applauded by the whole nation; and this harmony continued without the least interruption, till His Majesty's departure for his German dominions in 1755. Here, on a sudden, the scene changes: the Duke of Newcastle, who had been Her Royal Highness's favourite minister, and who had shown himself on many occasions a very useful friend, is now to be treated with the coldest civility; whilst Pitt, who had been a Groom of the bed-chamber to

the Prince her husband, and had not quitted his master in the most decent manner, makes a tender of his services, with the assistance of his relations and friends, which was joyfully accepted."

The Duke of Cumberland had always been the King's favoured son. I do not see any ground for believing that he had ever entertained those injurious designs against his nephew, which were imputed to him at Leicester House; his object was to have the entire patronage of the army. As a military commander he seems to have had no qualification beyond that of personal courage. In all his campaigns in Flanders, and at the battle of Hastenbeck in Germany, in 1757, he displayed no talents as a general. His partizans exalted his services at Culloden; but that was a victory obtained against irregular, undisciplined, ill-provided, and inferior forces. Whatever merit he might have from this victory, he tarnished his reputation by the cruelties which he practised over the inhabitants of the country; and seems to have deserved the character of brutal, merciless, and tyrannical.

The Earl Waldegrave is manifestly desirous of giving us favourable impressions of the Duke of Cumberland; but if his expressions are examined, it will be found that personal courage excepted, the Duke had no qualities which deserved esteem. Lord Waldegrave's character of him is as follows. "His Royal Highness's judgment would be equal to his parts, were it not too much guided by his passions, which are often violent and ungovernable. He has abilities to perform things which are difficult; but sometimes loves an impossibility. That he is ambitious, is not to be doubted: and had His Majesty died during the present Prince of Wales's minority, he would have most reasonably expected to have been the young King's general; or if he could have formed a party in Parliament strong enough to have repealed the act of regency, the Princess of Wales's authority might have suffered great diminution."

Mr. Fox had long been attached to him: this circumstance gave to Mr. Fox influence in the distribution of military patronage, and much political importance; but, on the

whole, the advantage was overbalanced. His connection with the Duke of Cumberland rendered him the object of jealousy; and he shared in the Duke's unpopularity.

The King's views were wholly directed to Hanover, and his German interests. He had gratified his inclinations by a visit to Hanover, early in the summer 1755. During his residence in that country, when it was seen that the measure of sending General Braddock to America, in the autumn 1754, was likely to produce hostilities with France, the King fearing that Prussia might enter into an alliance with the French, and that their joint forces might lay waste his German dominions, to protect Hanover from this dreaded invasion, entered into two subsidy treaties with the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel and the Empress of Russia. By the first of these treaties he secured the assistance of 12,000 Hessians; by the latter, he obtained a promise of 55,000 Russians. At the time that this treaty was entered into with Russia, the King certainly had in contemplation the continuance of his old alliance with Austria; and the Rus-

sian troops were probably the more readily promised him under the idea that he was the ally of Austria; but Austria demanded, as the price of her alliance, that he should co-operate with her in the recovery of Silesia. He hesitated to comply with this demand, recollecting that the King of Prussia might invade Hanover; to protect which he entered into a treaty with that monarch, by which they mutually engaged to prevent the entry of all foreign troops whatever into Germany. By this arrangement George II. deprived himself of the Russian troops. Austria immediately entered into an alliance with France, and Russia concurred with Austria in her designs against the King of Prussia. It may appear surprizing that George II. should so hastily have relinquished all the benefit to be derived from his Russian auxiliaries. When he entered into that treaty with the Czarina, the object of his fears was the invasion of Hanover by the joint forces of France and Prussia; but on more mature reflection, he saw that his immediate danger was from the King of Prussia alone, who, in a fortnight, without the assistance of French troops,

could have overrun the whole of his German dominions; while his Russian allies could not have arrived in sufficient time for his protection, and that it was this apprehension which led him so suddenly to change his plan, and to unite himself with the King of Prussia, by which he guarded in the most effectual manner against this impending danger.

I have already given the character of George II. as drawn by Leonidas Glover. Mr. Glover was an attendant at Leicester House, and from this circumstance was accustomed to view the actions of George II. with an unfavourable eye. The memoirs of the late Earl Waldegrave, which have been published since the first edition of these Recollections, enable us to form a more exact opinion of the character of George II. Lord Waldegrave tells us, that "he was always just, sometimes charitable, though seldom generous; but that too great an attention to money was his capital failing." I believe that these features are correctly marked. The Duke of Cumberland had always been his favoured son; and the

King had, for many years, lived on unfriendly terms with his eldest son, Frederick, Prince of Wales; but on his death, the King showed the strongest marks of kindness towards the Princess Dowager of Wales. He immediately procured an act to be passed, by which the regency was vested in the Princess Dowager in case of the King's death, during the minority of his grandson. He also left her the entire management of his grandson's education. This latter indulgence was injudicious; for the misfortunes brought on the British empire during the reign of George III., must, in a great measure, be attributed to the education given him by his mother.

During this summer, 1755, the Duke of Newcastle had exercised hostilities against France, without any declaration of War: He seized her merchantmen and fishing vessels on their return to their harbours, and by these means injured her commerce, and deprived her of her sailors. The French ministers heavily complained of this conduct of the British government at every Court in Europe, but abstained from de-

claring war, contenting themselves with secretly preparing the means of retaliation: thus stood public affairs on the meeting of Parliament, at the close of the year 1755.

I ought, perhaps, to take notice of a circumstance which contributed to a change in the conduct of the Princess Dowager towards the King. During His Majesty's residence at Hanover, he had seen two daughters of the Duke of Brunswick Wolfenbuttle; they were his near relations. He was much struck with the beauty, the understanding, and the accomplishments of one of them; and he conceived a desire that this lady should become the wife of his grandson. Nothing could be more repugnant to the designs of the Princess Dowager of Wales than this suggestion. She immediately perceived, that, if this marriage took place, the influence which this accomplished princess would soon acquire over her husband, must necessarily diminish that of the mother; and that her design of governing in her son's name at his accession,

would be rendered abortive. She, therefore, left no means unemployed to excite aversion in her son to the proposed marriage; and she succeeded so completely, that, on the King's return, he found that the proposed marriage could not take place. Whether the suggestion of this marriage had any effect in altering the Princess's conduct to the King, or whether the King's resentment was excited by seeing that his grandson was wholly withdrawn from his influence, I cannot say; but the Princess's conduct to the King was visibly changed from the time of his return to England in the autumn, 1755. In truth, we must date the commencement of the disunion between the King and Leicester House from this period.

The Earl Waldegrave relates the conduct which the King adopted on this occasion. He tells us, that "about three months after his return to England, His Majesty sent for the Prince of Wales into his closet; not to propose the match, knowing it would be to little purpose, but to find out the extent of his political knowledge; to sift him

in relation to Hanover, and to caution him against evil counsellors. The discourse was short, the substance kind and affectionate; but the manner was not quite gracious.

"The Prince was flustered and sulky; bowed, but scarce made any answer: so the conference ended very little to the satisfaction of either party. Here His Majesty was guilty of a very capital mistake: instead of sending for the Prince, he should have spoke firmly to the mother; told her, that, as she governed her son, she should be answerable for his conduct; that he would overlook what was past, and treat her still like a friend, if she behaved in a proper manner. But, on the other hand, if either herself, her son, or any person influenced by them, should give any future disturbance, she must expect no quarter. He might then have ended his admonition, by whispering a word in her ear, which would have made her tremble, in spite of her spotless innocence."

The Parliament opened in the beginning of the winter 1755, 6. Mr. Fox, who had

accepted the office of Secretary of State, Sir William Murray the Attorney-General, Mr. Hume Campbell, and Mr. Bubb Dodington, were the supporters of the measures of government. The opposition was composed of Mr. Pitt and his friends. To vindicate the measures of that incapable minister the Duke of Newcastle, would have been an arduous task, even if the combatants had been equal; but they were not equal, more especially in point of courage. The impetuous invective of Mr. Pitt bore down every thing before it. The combat is thus described by Mr. Glover: — "During this whole session (1755, 6), Mr. Pitt found occasion in every debate to confound the ministerial orators. His vehement invectives were awful to Murray; terrible to Hume Campbell; and no malefactor under the stripes of an executioner, was ever more forlorn and helpless than Fox appeared under the lash of Pitt's eloquence, shrewd and able in Parliament as Fox confessedly is; Dodington sheltered himself in silence."

The events which occurred during the session, which began at the close of the year

1755, and in the course of the summer 1756, completed the downfal of the Duke of Newcastle, and the triumph of Mr. Pitt. Before the opening of the ensuing session in the winter 1756, 7, the Duke of Newcastle, Mr. Fox, the Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, and Lord Anson resigned; Mr. Pitt was made Secretary of State; and his brother-in-law, Earl Temple, first Lord of the Admiralty, in the room of Lord Anson; but in the spring 1757, Mr. Pitt and his friends were removed from office through the influence of the Duke of Cumberland. Although the Duke of Cumberland had sufficient influence with the King to remove Mr. Pitt and his friends from office, yet he had not the means of procuring for him an efficient and permanent administration to succeed them. During the early part of the summer 1757, the King remained deprived of ministers, every negotiation, every attempt to prevail on men to enter into the King's service, failed, and the King was at last obliged to consent to a coalition between the Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Pitt, as the only means of procuring for himself efficient and responsible

servants.' Such was the situation to which George II. was at last reduced, by the conduct of that contemptible minister, Holles, Duke of Newcastle. I have before extracted the character of this minister from Mr. Glover's Memoirs. I will here insert the character of the same person, as given us by the Earl Waldegrave; the two portraits bear so strong a resemblance to each other, that it is impossible to doubt their being correct likenesses.

"The Duke of Newcastle is in his 35th year of ministerial longevity, has been much abused, much flattered, and still more ridiculed. From the year 1724, to the year 1742, he was Secretary of State, acting under Sir Robert Walpole; he continued in the same situation during Lord Granville's short administration; but Granville, who had the parts and knowledge, yet had not, at all times, the discretion of an able minister, treated him with too much contempt, especially as he wanted his assistance in the House of Commons, where Granville had little interest of his own.

" After Granville's defeat, the Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Pelham became joint ministers; here he seems to have reached the highest degree of power where he can reasonably hope to maintain himself.

" Ambition, fear, and jealousy, are his prevailing passions.

" In the midst of prosperity and apparent happiness, the slightest disappointment, or any imaginary evil, will, in a moment, make him miserable; his mind can never be composed; his spirits are always agitated; yet this constant ferment, which would wear out and destroy any other man, is perfectly agreeable to his constitution; he is at the very perfection of health when his fever is at the greatest height.

" His character is full of inconsistencies; the man would be thought very singular who differed as much from the rest of the world as he differs from himself.

" If we consider how many years he has continued in the highest employments;

that he has acted a very considerable part amongst the most considerable persons of his own time; that when his friends have been routed, he has still maintained his ground; that he has incurred his Majesty's displeasure on various occasions, but has always carried his point, and has soon been restored both to favour and confidence; it cannot be denied that he possesses some qualities of an able minister; yet view him in a different light, and our veneration will be somewhat abated; talk to him concerning public or private business, of a nice or delicate nature, he will be found confused; irresolute, continually rambling from the subject, contradicting himself almost every instant.

"Hear him speak in Parliament; his manner is ungraceful, his language barbarous, his reasoning inconclusive. At the same time, he labours through all the confusion of a debate without the least distrust of his own abilities; fights boldly in the dark; never gives up the cause; nor is he ever at a loss either for words or argument.

" His professions and promises are not to be depended on, though, at the time they are made, he often means to perform them; but is unwilling to displease any man by a plain negative, and frequently does not recollect that he is under the same engagements to at least ten competitors.

" If he cannot be esteemed a steady friend, he has never shown himself a bitter enemy; and his forgiveness of injuries proceeds as much from good nature as it does from policy.

" Pride is not to be numbered amongst his faults; on the contrary, he deviates into the opposite extreme, and courts popularity with such extravagant eagerness, that he frequently descends to an undistinguishing and illiberal familiarity.

" Neither can he be accused of avarice, or of rapaciousness; for, though he will give bribes, he is above accepting them; and instead of having enriched himself at the expence of his master, or of the public, he has greatly impaired a very considerable

estate by electioneering, and keeping up a good parliamentary interest, which is commonly, though, perhaps improperly, called the service of the crown.

"His extraordinary care of his health is a jest even amongst his flatterers. As to his jealousy, it could not be carried to a higher pitch, if every political friend was a favourite mistress.

"He is in his 64th or 65th year, yet thirsts for power in a future reign with the greatest solicitude, and hereafter, should he live to see a Prince of Wales of a year old, he will still look forward, not without expectation, that in due course of time he may be his minister also.

"Upon the whole, he seems tolerably well qualified to act a second part, but wants both spirit and capacity to be first in command; neither has he the smallest particle of that elevation of mind, or of that dignity of behaviour, which commands respect, and characterises the great Statesman."

I have said that Sir Robert Walpole had governed the country by uniting the influence of government to the Whig party. The failure of the rebellion in 1745, had evinced that there was no longer any danger of the return of the Stuarts, and as the Whigs had been kept together by this fear, the bands of their union as a party became weakened. The Duke of Newcastle adopted a system different from that of his predecessor Sir Robert Walpole; his plan was to obtain an immediate and direct influence in boroughs, and that this influence should belong personally, either to himself, or to his confederates. His friends relinquished the name of Whigs, and assumed that of the Pelham party. The Duke of Newcastle's character was admirably suited to succeed in this plan; and we are told by Mr. Glover, that he had acquired the command of the most powerful faction ever known in this country; the Earl Waldegrave confirms this assertion of Mr. Glover, for he tells us, that when he, (the Earl Waldegrave,) had yielded to the King's solicitations, and accepted the office of first Lord

of the Treasury in 1757, the Duke of Newcastle put his negative on the appointment, by signifying that he could not support his Lordship with his majority in Parliament.

The Duke of Newcastle's system has been continued to the present time; individuals do not attach themselves to a *political party*, but to *political men*; they call themselves *Pittites* or *Foxites*, and the object of each contending party is avowed to be the possession of the administration. No man contributed more than the late Mr. Edmund Burke to bring forward this state of parties. He openly inculcated, that you were to look not to measures, but to men. This doctrine might serve the purpose of bringing together men who wished to share in the emoluments of office; but it does not attract those who are only solicitous for the public welfare. If ever an opposition is to be powerful, it must have in view some great public object; such, for example, as the Reform of Parliament; or Economy in the Public Expenditure; or a

diminution of the Standing Army; or some object in which every subject of the empire is interested. I will add one remark: so powerful was the Duke of Newcastle from the faction which he had formed, that after having kept his Sovereign without ministers for more than ten weeks, this despicable man was able, at last, to compel the King to receive an administration to which he had a decided aversion.

Mr. Pitt, distinguished afterwards by the title of Earl of Chatham, had, in his speeches in the House of Commons, declared most explicitly against the sacrifice of British interests to the German views of the Elector of Hanover. He had expressed himself on this subject with a violence which some men thought improper.

On the resignation of the Duke of Newcastle and his friends, in 1756, Mr. Pitt had towards the close of that year been made Secretary of State. He was removed from that situation in the spring 1757. During the few months that he had been Secretary

of State, he had probably discovered that he could not be the efficient minister, unless he yielded to George the Second's views for the defence of Hanover. This opinion led to Mr. Pitt's coalition with the Duke of Newcastle in the summer 1757. We have a very interesting detail of a conversation held by Mr. Glover with Mr. Pitt on this subject. As it is very curious, I will give it in Mr. Glover's own words. "The universal propensity, in this important crisis, (the spring 1757,) to a coalition between Mr. Pitt and the Duke of Newcastle, induced me to wait upon Mr. Pitt himself, without reserve or partiality, to deliver my sentiments on the public situation and his own, and expecting a return of candour in consequence of his many intimations conveyed through Lord Temple and others, of an earnest desire to see me, I made him two visits within a few days after his resignation. Our conversation and demeanour were suitable to the intimacy and friendship which had commenced with our youth, and subsisted for no inconsiderable part of our lives.

" The neglect and indifference on my side for the last twelve years, seemed to have made no impression upon him, and the remembrance of his frailties, which had created my former disgust, was lost in the expectation which all men conceived from his altered principles and conduct. The substance of our conferences may be reduced to the following heads :

" He frankly disclosed, under my promise of secrecy, the most material occurrences between him and the King, who most apparently had never reposed the least confidence in him ; yet awed by his spirit and popular name, had treated him with a civil, though inflexible reserve. He asked me in what manner I would advise him to word his answer to the City of London, upon the compliment they intended to make him of his freedom. I advised him to be very general in his expressions, and to retain in his private thoughts as little regard to their present approbation, as he had done to their censure in the case of Byng ; to form, as an honest man, the best opinions he was

able, and ever to keep in remembrance, that

> 'Justum et tenacem propositi virum
> Non civium ardor prava jubentium,
> Non vultus instantis tyranni,
> Mente quatit solidâ.'

That his greatest trial was immediate; all orders and conditions of men were now united in one cry for a coalition between him and the Duke of Newcastle, whose instability, treachery, timidity, and servile devotion to the King, were indisputably known, and to whom, interposed Mr. Pitt, all our public misfortunes are more imputable than to any other man. But what must be done? We are now in the most desperate and flagitious hands, capable of any violence. The Duke of Cumberland would not hesitate to silence the complaints of an aggrieved people by a regiment of the guards, a measure which Fox would as little scruple to advise. 'I grant them,' said I, 'to be the heads of a Catilinarian band; but will your union with Newcastle prevent the mischief?' 'Do not imagine' replied he, 'that I can be induced to unite with him, unless

sure of power; I mean power over public measures. The disposition of offices, except the few efficient ones of Administration, the creating Deans, Bishops, and every placeman besides, is quite out of my plan, and which I willingly would relinquish to the Duke of Newcastle.' 'Give me leave,' said I, 'to suppose you united in Administration with him; then let us consider the part which he (admitting him to be sincere,) will have to act. You have no command in either House of Parliament, and have experienced the personal dislike of the King. You must depend altogether on the Duke of Newcastle for a majority in Parliament, and on his fighting your battles in the closet; and, to speak plainly, using his efforts to alienate a father from a favoured son (the Duke of Cumberland) who is your declared enemy.

"'Supposing Newcastle sincere, is his composition stern enough for such encounters? But knowing him false, selfish, and insatiable of power, will he not rather make his own way, and re-establish himself in the King's favour by every servile gratifi-

cation of his will? Then shall I be grieved to see you, the first man in Great Britain at this juncture, become a subaltern to the lowest. Sir, you are governed by a noble principle; the love of fame; do not hazard that glorious acquisition on such precarious ground. As you are the only object in the nation's eye, every wrong measure, every miscarriage will be imputed to you. You may say, you can but quit your situation again: true; but are you sure of returning to the same situation of character and importance which you now possess? Necessity brought you in the last time (towards the end of 1756); you soon found there was no raising an edifice without materials; the materials cannot exist, till calamity has utterly changed the temper, manners, and principles of the whole nation. Calamity, perhaps, is not very distant from us; when you can command your materials, and necessity puts the power in your hands, then resume your task. To conclude, I mean, that with such a coadjutor as Newcastle, and with such a House of Commons, it is impossible for an honest man to serve this country; and I am satisfied, that your

magnanimity, experience, and discernment must see this coalition in a worse light than I am capable of representing it. After all, Sir, if you must yield to the pressure of all your friends, and the whole public, soliciting and clamouring for this measure, remember, I compare you to Curtius, whose courage I should have admired when he leapt into the gulph; though, as his friend, I never would have counselled him to take that leap.' I then took occasion to pass some compliments upon him, which, together with my preceding discourse, drew this answer.

" 'I am quite happy in the good opinion you entertain of your old acquaintance. Let me assure you that I have drawn a line which I will not pass; so far perhaps I may be driven, but beyond it, never.' I then wound up the conversation, with reminding him of the Inquiry, and the Militia: the first then depending in the House of Commons, I took for granted he would prosecute with vigour; and just hinted, that at all events it was highly material for him not to omit so fair an opportunity of evincing

to mankind the utter incapacity of his predecessors in Administration. He seemed struck with the thought, and gave me assurances that he would take his part in that inquiry; but, at the same time, I perceived he did not mean to go any great lengths; that is, would content himself with showing the incapacity, &c. without insisting too earnestly on either punishment or censure."

From this very important conversation, it is clear that Mr. Pitt had even at that time decided on a coalition with the Duke of Newcastle; he soon after accepted the seals as Secretary of State, and in the November following, after the Battle of Rosbach, consented to support the King in a breach of the neutrality of Closterseven, and the renewal of the German war.

From the time that the coalition between the Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Pitt took place, viz. from the summer 1757, to the death of George II. in October 1760, the war was conducted with ability and success. As an Englishman, I cannot but regret that Mr. Pitt involved us in the German war.

We feel to this hour the immense load of debt which was the result of this measure. Mr. Pitt could not have been the minister except he had sacrificed the interests of his country to the King's German views. I admit it. But the sacrifice was great. I will not undervalue the advantages which Great Britain derived from Mr. Pitt. He revived the energetic character of his country. The administrations of Sir Robert Walpole and the Pelhams had debased the nation. It appeared renewed in all its strength when its force was directed by this great man. Perhaps the revival of this energetic character was of more value than all the acquisitions which he made; but it must be acknowledged, that he not only abandoned all his former professions, but that he sacrificed the interests of his country to the personal wishes of George II.

Mr. Pitt remained Secretary of State, and conducted the operations of the war, till September 1761. Whether he was duped by the artful and treacherous mind of the Duke of Newcastle; or whether he found it absolutely impossible to conduct public

affairs in the manner which he thought most beneficial to his country, except he yielded to the wishes of George II., I cannot say; but he was gradually seduced into the approbation of German connexions, and a German war. In yielding in this manner to the views of George II., he departed from certain principles which had been adopted at Leicester House; and it is probable that his deviation from these principles had lost him the influence which he had formerly possessed in that quarter; for after the death of Frederick Prince of Wales, the maxims of the party of which that Prince had been the head, seem always to have been retained at Leicester House; and George III. only acted agreeably to those maxims, when, at his accession, he manifested a wish to terminate the German war. I have no doubt but that Mr. Secretary Pitt was sincere in his aversion to German connexions; and in those declarations which he had repeatedly made, that England ought not to be involved in a continental war; but he was the dupe either of George II., or of the Duke of Newcastle, or he sacrificed to his own ambition; and he was

the more censurable for having yielded on this head; inasmuch as after the Convention of Closterseven, in September 1757, England was completely disengaged from Hanover. The Hanoverian Government having of their own accord adopted a neutrality. It is much to be regretted, that Mr. Pitt yielded to the King in this instance. The far greater part of the debt contracted in the seven years' war, was the consequence of the dereliction of this principle; and the difficulty which occurred on the subsequent Negotiation for Peace in 1761, chiefly arose from those connexions which Mr. Pitt had formed with the King of Prussia. In what I have said, I may perhaps be supposed, to have spoken somewhat unfavourably of the late Earl of Chatham; but I have endeavoured to speak with the fairness of an historian. As a war minister, he certainly displayed much sagacity, and great energies; and although he was removed from office in the autumn 1761, yet the achievements subsequently performed; (I mean the acquisition of Martinico, the Havannah, and Manilla,) must be attributed to him. He had collected the forces which made those

conquests; and his energetic mind had given that heroic impulse to British soldiers and sailors, which rendered every attempt successful. I cannot, however, but regret his having involved us in the German war. His coalition with the Duke of Newcastle in 1757, had another bad consequence; it occasioned him to be considered, at Leicester House, as having abandoned the principles of their party; and, perhaps, by this, he lost the confidence of the young King, who seems to have been educated by his mother in those political principles which had prevailed at Leicester House, during the life of her husband.

I have said, that on the accession of George III. the two objects on which he seemed most intent, were, the breaking the Pelham confederacy, and the terminating the German war. I believe I am correct in this assertion; but it may be proper to point out the circumstances by which the young King was probably induced to form these wishes.

Sir Robert Walpole was compelled to

resign the situation of Prime Minister in February 1742. His fall from power was the result of the efforts of a party, at the head of which appeared Frederick Prince of Wales. By the decision of the Chippenham election, Sir Robert Walpole lost that majority in Parliament by which he had for so many years been supported. Much money had been expended by the party to break down his superiority in the House of Commons, more particularly by the Prince of Wales. I will not stop at this place to examine the merits or demerits of Sir Robert Walpole during the twenty years that he was minister; nor shall I state the various circumstances which prevented any benefit being obtained for the country on the fall of the obnoxious minister. But I wish to remark, that, during the latter years of Sir Robert Walpole's administration, two points had been much discussed at Leicester House; and finally resolved on, as the principles by which the future conduct of the party was to be regulated. The first was, that the distinction of Whig and Tory should be abolished, and employments conferred indiscriminately on

men of either party. The second was, that the interest of England should no longer be sacrificed to the continental views of the elector of Hanover.

At the accession of George I., he was surrounded by those who called themselves Whigs; and not only gave himself up to their guidance in his political concerns, but injudiciously adopted their resentments against the Tories. This monarch was very little acquainted with the state of England. He knew that Queen Anne would have preferred her brother to have been her successor; and perhaps suspected, that the Queen's ministers had some disposition to gratify her Majesty in this wish. By placing himself wholly under the guidance of the Whigs, he became, in fact, the Sovereign only of a portion of the people, and all who were denominated Tories were proscribed. The Tory party at that time, comprized the greater part of the landed interest, and a large proportion of those who were of the established Church; for the violence of the Whig party had included under the denomination of Tories, all who were the oppo-

nents of their views. As George II. continued his father's minister Sir Robert Walpole, in his service, the same proscription of the Tories was persevered in. The mischievous consequences of this policy were strongly felt; and the Opposition, which assembled at Leicester House, and acted under the guidance of the Prince of Wales, adopted as a fundamental principle of their party, that this distinction should be put an end to, and that Whigs and Tories should be indiscriminately employed. They called this establishing a broad bottomed administration.

The second point resolved on by the Opposition assembled at Leicester House, was, that the interests of England should no longer be sacrificed to George II.'s continental views, as Elector of Hanover. It may seem surprizing, that Frederick Prince of Wales, who was himself by birth a German, and heir apparent to the electorate of Hanover, should have consented to this resolution; but his resentment against his father got the better of every other consideration; and this resolution, that the

interests of England should no longer be sacrificed to continental connexions, was adopted as another leading principle on which the party was to act.

Early in the year 1761, a pamphlet was published under the influence of Leicester House; its title was, "Considerations on the German War." Its author; Mr. Israel Manduit, was paid for this work with a pension of 200*l.* a year for his life; and it was not concealed, that the pamphlet was published with the approbation of men who were in power. So many years have elapsed since I saw this pamphlet, that I cannot now speak to its merits; but the author was certainly right in the position which he endeavoured to establish; viz. "that it was not for the interest of England to persevere in the German War." At the close of the year 1761, France had lost all her possessions on the continent of North America; the whole of her influence in the East Indies; and nearly all her possessions on the coast of Africa, and in the West Indies, except Martinico and St. Domingo, which latter island it certainly would not have

been advisable for this country to have attacked. The only part of the war which remained, was in Germany; and if that leading maxim to which I have before alluded, (that England should not be involved in a continental war on account of Hanover,) was judicious, it certainly was for the interest of this country to make peace with France. During the summer, 1761, a negotiation for peace was opened with the Court of Versailles. M. de Bussy came to England for the purpose of conducting the treaty. From the papers which passed during that negotiation, I think it clearly apparent, that the French government sincerely wished for peace; but Mr. Secretary Pitt certainly did not wish for peace. In truth, Great Britain could not re-establish a permanent peace with France, without abandoning that connexion with the King of Prussia, in which Mr. Pitt had most injudiciously involved his country. Towards the close of the negotiation, M. de Bussy, having intimated that the Courts of Versailles and Madrid mutually supported each other's interests, Mr. Pitt took fire at this insinuation, and proposed an imme-

diate declaration of war against Spain. Those ministers of George III. who wished to terminate the war with France, hesitated to consent to a proposal which must have immediately extended the war, and placed at a still greater distance the prospect of peace. Whether those British ministers who wished for peace acted wisely on this occasion, I will not pretend to say. Perhaps bolder men would either immediately have relinquished those objects in the negotiation for which Mr. Pitt had contended, and completed their treaty of peace with France; or have adopted Mr. Pitt's proposal, and immediately declared war against Spain. They did neither; they prolonged their negotiation with France, and demanded explanations from Spain. By these means, they gave Spain time to prepare herself for war; and when Spain had made those preparations, the British ministers adopted Mr. Pitt's proposal, and declared war against that power. I think those ministers of the British cabinet who wished to terminate the war, acted honestly; but the middle course which they pursued, did not evince their abilities as statesmen. The other maxim

which had been agreed on by the party at Leicester House, was, that the distinction of Whig and Tory should be abolished. I think this was a wise and honest determination. But at the accession of George III. this measure could not be carried into effect without breaking the Pelham party, a factious confederacy which had been allowed to form itself after the fall of Sir Robert Walpole. To destroy the Pelham faction was a measure absolutely necessary, if the King meant to persevere in that principle which had been adopted at Leicester House; viz. that the proscription of a large proportion of the people under the name of Tories, should be put an end to, and that employments should be conferred indiscriminately, whatever might have been the opinions of the ancestors of those on whom the offices were bestowed; for the power of the Pelham faction depended on the confinement of the royal patronage to a select body. By Mr. Pitt's coalition with the Duke of Newcastle, in the summer of 1757, and by his engaging in the German war, the late King, at his accession in 1760, must have considered Mr. Pitt as having abandoned the two great

principles which had been adopted at Leicester House; for Mr. Pitt had united himself with the Pelham party, and had involved the country in a continental war. It is not surprising, therefore, that Mr. Pitt had no longer the same influence at Leicester House as he had formerly possessed. The Earl of Bute was brought forward to effectuate the measures of Leicester House. The King was unfortunate in this choice; the retired and reserved habits of life of the late Earl of Bute, had rendered him but little qualified for the post of Minister; and the destruction of the Pelham faction, which from its long possession of the exclusive distribution of office and emolument, had become extremely powerful, was a measure too formidable to be attempted by the Earl of Bute. There was another circumstance unfortunate for the King. Soon after his accession, the Princess Dowager of Wales, the Earl of Bute, and the King, imprudently entered into a personal contest with John Wilkes. The powers of government were employed to oppress him; and the personal character of the King suffered from the victory. The opponents of the Princess Dow-

ager of Wales, did not scruple to insinuate a criminal connexion between the Princess Dowager and the Earl of Bute; but I cannot see any fair ground for this imputation. If we look into the Diary of Bubb Dodington, who seems always to have kept up much intercourse with Leicester House, after the death of the Prince of Wales; the Princess Dowager appears to have retained the most lively affection for the memory of her husband. That those who had been attached to him, should, at some future period, be provided for, seems to have been a sentiment uppermost in her mind. During the reign of George II., she wisely abstained from taking much share in political discussions. Yet she seems always to have preserved a wish, that the two great principles of the Leicester House party should be carried into effect; viz. that the distinction of Whig and Tory should be abolished; and the interests of England no longer sacrificed to those of the Hanoverian government.

I must acknowledge, however, that the Earl Waldegrave seems to have thought

that there was ground for this imputation on the character of the Princess Dowager.

It does not appear that the Earl of Bute had much power at Leicester House before the establishment of the Prince's court. This took place when the young Prince had entered his 19th year. About four or five years before the death of George II. the Earl of Bute was placed at the head of that court, as Groom of the Stole; and his political influence must be considered as having commenced at that period. I do not hesitate a moment to say, that the Earl of Bute was unequal to the situation of minister; but if those principles which had been adopted at Leicester House at the close of Sir Robert Walpole's administration, were judicious; I do not see how the Earl of Bute can be blamed for having endeavoured to carry them into effect; for this was all which he attempted; although, in the attempt, he displayed very little ability, and much imprudence. The Earl of Bute was much reproached for the peace which he had made; and people were every where persuaded that the benefits which we had obtained

from the peace, were inadequate to our successes in the war. The partisans of the Earl of Bute seem never to have had the courage to bring forward that circumstance, which was the strongest vindication of the peace; viz. that we had terminated our connexion with the King of Prussia, and put an end to a war nowise necessary for the interest of England. I have been told, and from an authority on which I place great confidence; that in the original copy of the King's first speech to Parliament, which was framed by the Earl of Bute; the epithets applied to the war, were, *a bloody and expensive war.* Mr. Pitt and the other members of the cabinet, revolted at these epithets; and they were altered to *just and necessary war.* Let it not be supposed that I am a panegyrist of the Earl of Bute. He was wholly unfit for the station of Prime Minister; but I think he does not deserve to have been abused for want of integrity. He resigned from pusillanimity; and though the King might possibly retain favour for him, yet I believe that his Majesty, never after, had any confidence in him.

I will here subjoin the character given of the Earl of Bute, by Lord Waldegrave:—"This treaty (between Mr. Pitt and the Princess Dowager of Wales, in 1755,) was negotiated by the Earl of Bute, at that time a favourite of little fame; but who has since merited a very uncommon reputation, and who is supposed to execute a most honourable office with great ability.

"He had been Lord of the Bedchamber to the late Prince; has a good person, fine legs, and a theatrical air of the greatest importance.

"There is an extraordinary appearance of wisdom, both in his look and manner of speaking; for, whether the subject be serious or trifling, he is equally pompous, slow, and sententious.

"Not contented with being wise, he would be thought a polite scholar, and a man of great erudition; but has the misfortune never to succeed, except with those who are exceedingly ignorant; for his historical knowledge is chiefly taken from tragedies,

wherein he is very deeply read; and his classical learning extends no farther than a French translation.

"The late Prince of Wales, who was not over nice in the choice of ministers, used frequently to say, that Bute was a fine showy man, who would make an excellent ambassador in a court where there was no business. Such was his Royal Highness's opinion of the noble Earl's political abilities; but the sagacity of the Princess Dowager has discovered other accomplishments, of which the Prince, her husband, may not, perhaps, have been the most competent judge.

"The substance of the treaty was, that Pitt and his friends should, to their utmost, support the Princess and her son; that they should oppose the Duke of Cumberland, and raise a clamour against him; and as to the King, they were to submit to his government, provided he would govern as they directed him."

On the resignation of the Earl of Bute,

the King was under the necessity of resorting to Mr. George Grenville as his Prime Minister. This gentleman had been educated in the study of the law; his habits of life had rendered him capable of laborious application; and he was supposed to be well acquainted with commercial subjects. With these qualifications, we cannot help being astonished at the various erroneous measures which he adopted. He persevered in justifying the use of general warrants, by which the messengers of the Secretaries of State had been accustomed to arrest any man, though not named in the warrant, if they chose to consider him as designated by the description, of the author, the printer, or the publisher, of a supposed libel. Common sense sufficiently pointed out, that this description designated no man in particular, but gave permission to the messengers to arrest whomsoever they thought proper. It is true, that this was the form in which the warrants of the Secretaries of State had usually been drawn; but when this usage was objected to, Mr. Grenville's knowledge of the law ought to have restrained him from risking his reputation on the defence of it.

His restrictions on the intercourse between the island of Jamaica and the Spanish Main were injudicious; but we forget these minor points when we reflect on the calamity which he brought on his country by the stamp-act. I will acknowledge, that I have never been an admirer of that tribunal which he established for the trial of contested elections of members of the House of Commons. The most that can be said in its favour, is, that it is better than the mode of trial which existed before.

Junius, in his letter to the Duke of Bedford, attributes the removal of Mr. George Grenville, and his colleagues, the Earl of Halifax, and the Earl of Egremont, to the influence of the Earl of Bute. But the King and the Princess-Dowager were themselves sufficiently sensible to the affront intended to be put on the Princess-Dowager of Wales, by excluding her from the number of those to whom the king might confide the regency during his son's minority; and I believe that I am correct in saying, that the removal of Mr. Grenville was the act of the King himself.

On the removal of the Rockinghams, in 1766, the King employed Mr. Pitt to form an administration. From the accounts we have of Mr. Pitt's conduct on that occasion, he seems to have acted as if he thought that he had gained the entire possession of his sovereign's confidence. In this he was mistaken. He certainly showed very little wisdom in the administration which he formed. He placed the Duke of Grafton at the head of this ministry, as a puppet to be directed by himself. The Earl of Chatham fell ill, and the derelict mind of the Duke of Grafton was instantly seized by the first occupant. Charles Townshend was that first occupant; and, as Charles Townshend himself had no fixed principles, it was not surprising that the Minister under his guidance sometimes proposed one measure, and, a short time after, another its reverse.

In describing the situation of the Duke of Grafton, while he was minister, in 1769, Junius does not seem to have gone beyond the truth. His expressions are these:— "You became minister by accident, were

adopted without choice, trusted without confidence, and continued without favour; be assured that whenever an occasion presses, you will be discarded without even the forms of regret." The four assertions are literally true. He did become minister by accident: when he was placed at the head of the Treasury, it was openly proclaimed, that he was to act under the guidance and direction of the Earl of Chatham: the accident of the Earl of Chatham's illness left him minister: he was adopted by the King from necessity, not from choice; employed without confidence, and continued without favour; and the prophecy of Junius, that he would be dismissed without even the forms of regret, was minutely accomplished.

Charles Townshend died in the summer, 1767. He was succeeded in the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer by Lord North; but Tommy Bradshaw, the Secretary, had acquired entire possession of the vacant mind of the Duke of Grafton; and before the end of that year he united his master in close alliance with the Bedford party. From the time that the Duke of Bed-

ford, Earl Gower, and others of that party, were brought into office, we must consider the Earl of Chatham as no longer a member of the administration. The opinion which the Earl of Chatham had publicly proclaimed, "that the British Parliament had no right to tax the American colonies," was from that hour odious; and different measures were adopted, retracted, and renewed, until the Americans were provoked to hostilities.

I am aware that *in my Recollections*, I am thought by some persons to have spoken with too little respect of the character of George III. He possessed all those virtues of temperance which entitle the individual to respect in private life. But as the supreme magistrate, he violated those duties which he owed to the people. Aversion to the free principles of the English Constitution; a dread that his power might be encroached upon; a wish to be a King after the model of a German prince; these were the sentiments by which he was always actuated; and when the historian, at some future period, describes the events of his

reign, the war which produced the separation of the American colonies; and that crusade against French principles, which will most probably be found to have diminished the prerogatives of royalty in all the states of Europe, must form the leading subject of his story.

It has been my wish to furnish materials for the historian. I have stated facts without fear; uninfluenced, I am certain, by aversion; and, as far as I could watch over myself, not misled by personal affection. I acknowledge, that abhorrence of those measures by which the Americans were induced to separate themselves from Great Britain, has ever been a leading sentiment in my breast. Every year points out more forcibly the calamitous consequences. They are now become a nation of ten millions of people: they have a navy capable of coping with our own. They are our rivals in commerce; and, in case of hostilities, the two Canadas must ultimately fall a victim to their efforts. In negotiating the peace of 1783, it would have been more advisable in our ministers to have relinquished the

possession of those two provinces. We have already been once called on to defend them against the Americans. We were successful, but at what expense? If ever the Upper Canada become populous, it will prefer a union with the States of America, to the remaining dependant on Great Britain; and Lower Canada, even though it were defensible, is of no value. What have we not already expended on these provinces? and if they are to be defended, what sum is it not probable that we shall waste before we get rid of them.

The Fur-trade of Canada has been said to be of importance: it may be profitable to the North-West Company, which possesses the exclusive commerce; but it is of a value to Great Britain very inadequate to the expense occasioned by the possession of the colony. It has been thought politic to encourage the importation of timber from Canada; and with that view we have suffered Canada timber to be imported duty-free, and raised the duty on Norway and Russia timber to such a degree, as nearly to prevent their importation into this country.

What sum has not been lost by the British revenue from this policy! The Canadian timber is certainly inferior in quality to the Norwegian; and much of that which is imported under the name of Canadian timber, is the growth of the territory of the United States. It has been said that the timber-trade with Canada employs a great body of our sailors, who will be useful to us in time of war. The Norwegian sailors are equally at our command when we have occasion for them: their habits of life are so similar to those of English sailors, that they are easily tempted by the high wages to enter into our service.

I do not entertain similar opinions respecting the two Floridas. I regret that they were ceded to Spain at the peace of 1783. It was a cruel, and, as I believe, an unnecessary abandonment of the interests of those British subjects who had settled there. British settlers could not remain under the Spanish government; and as it was not probable that Spanish settlers would repair thither for the sake of cultivating the soil, the clause in the treaty, that British settlers

might dispose of their property, must be considered as almost nugatory. The harbours in East Florida, though suited only to receive ships of small burden, will afford great means of annoying the merchant ships of Jamaica on their return to Europe. A heavy loaded merchantman with great difficulty makes its passage to the windward, by the eastern end of Cuba; and to a fleet of merchantmen, such a passage is impracticable. I believe it is never attempted. The harbours in West Florida command all traffic to La Vera Cruz, and New Orleans. My regret is increased, by reflecting that the province of East Florida was completely defensible against all attacks by land from the United States of America; and this at very little expense. I might add, that, from its situation between two seas, it is the healthiest part of North America; and as it partakes in some degree of the influence of the tropical winds, it scarcely suffers more from the heat of summer, than from the cold of winter. It is even said that its poorest soil, the pine-barren land, is now found to be fit for the production of cotton.

On the Revolution in 1688, *and the Act of Settlement in the* 13*th of William III. Anno Dom.* 1700.

The Revolution of 1688 has produced such important consequences to England, that every Englishman, solicitous for the prosperity of his country, is necessarily compelled to reflect on it. We must not confine ourselves to the character of William III. as an individual. If he is to be viewed as a private man, he seems to have possessed no quality which deserved either affection or esteem. His attack on Marshal Luxembourg, at the moment when he knew that the preliminaries of peace were actually signed at Nimeguen, was the conduct of a man void of every sentiment of humanity; but we must not view William III. in the character of a private man. We must view him as a political character. At an early period of his life, he was brought forward to assist the Dutch in resisting the design which Louis XIV. had formed of subjugating their country. His efforts were successful: from this contest his hatred to

Louis XIV. and his solicitude for the welfare of the United Provinces originated, and they were the springs which guided all his actions through the whole course of his life. In their progress they generated ambition; the ambitious desire of being the head of a confederacy which might resist the designs of the King of France.

In 1688, he was invited over to England by the joint solicitations of Tories and Whigs; for the Tories were as desirous of preserving the established religion of the church of England, as the Presbyterians were of preventing the establishment of Popery and despotism. If the Prince of Orange had been actuated by no other motive than that of preserving to England its liberties, and the Protestant religion, he could have obtained these ends on terms far more beneficial to England; for a change of dynasty is always attended with much inconvenience. He had it in his power to have established such regulations as would have effectually secured the country against James's wish of introducing Popery; and he might have placed the child of James II. under the care of such persons as would

have preserved him from being infected by Popish doctrines. But ambition was the spring which influenced the conduct of the Prince of Orange. He saw that the possession of the power of England would place him at the head of that confederacy, which he had long been endeavouring to form as a barrier to the designs of France; and every other consideration yielded to his ambition.

When elevated to the throne of England, he seems to have been ready to have employed either Whigs or Tories, as he found each party subservient to his ambitious views; but as the Whigs were more disposed to supply him with money for his continental war, they generally had his preference. Towards the close of his life, and after the death of the Duke of Gloucester, when there was little prospect that the Princess Anne of Denmark would have issue, he proposed the further limitation of the crown to the house of Brunswick. Perhaps he thought that this measure would be more beneficial to England than any other which could be suggested; but it could not escape him that this limitation would secure to

him a very powerful ally in that war, respecting the Spanish succession, which was about to break forth. The Tories concurred with the Whigs in the further limitation of the crown; and they seem to have been actuated by anxious solicitude for the liberties of England, as much as by their attachment to the established church. During the lives of George I. and George II., the government was entirely in the hands of the Whigs; and during those two reigns, the Tories were never spoken of but as men who were indifferent to the principles of liberty, and solicitous only for the return of the Stuarts. Their conduct, when the further limitation of the crown to the house of Brunswick was proposed by King William, vindicates them from this aspersion. The Tories had at that time the ascendant in the House of Commons, and we have this account of their conduct from the historian Smollet. "The next object that engrossed the attention of the Commons was the settlement of the succession to the throne, which the King had recommended to their consideration in the beginning of the Session. Having deliberated on this

subject, they resolved that, for the preservation of the peace and happiness of the kingdom, and the security of the Protestant religion, it was absolutely necessary that a further declaration should be made of the limitation and succession of the crown in the Protestant line, after His Majesty and the Princess, and the heirs of their bodies respectively; but that further provision should be first made for the security of the rights and liberties of the people. Mr. Harley then moved, that some conditions of government might be settled as preliminaries, before they should proceed to the nomination of the person, that their security might be complete. Accordingly they deliberated on this subject, and agreed to the following resolutions: That whoever shall hereafter come to the possession of this crown shall join in communion with the church of England as by law established; that, in case the crown and imperial dignity of this realm shall hereafter come to any person not being a native of this kingdom of England, this nation be not obliged to engage in any war for the defence of any dominions or territories which do not be-

long to the crown of England, without the consent of Parliament; that no person who shall hereafter come to the possession of the crown shall go out of the dominions of England, Scotland, or Ireland, without consent of Parliament; that, from and after the time that the further limitation by this Act shall take effect, all matters and things relating to the well-governing of this kingdom, which are properly cognizable in the privy council, by the laws and customs of the realm, shall be transacted there, and all resolutions taken thereupon shall be signed by such of the privy council as shall advise and consent to the same; that, after the limitations shall take effect, no person born out of the kingdom of England, Scotland, or Ireland, or the dominions thereunto belonging, although he be naturalized, and made a denizen, (except such as are born of English parents,) shall be capable to be of the privy council, or a member of either House of Parliament, or to enjoy any office or place of trust, either civil or military, or to have any grant of lands, tenements, or hereditaments from the crown to himself, or to any others in trust for him;

that no person who has an office or place of profit under the King, or receives a pension from the crown, shall be capable of serving as member of the House of Commons; that after the limitation shall take effect, Judges' commissions be made *quamdiu se bene gesserint*, and their salaries ascertained and established, but upon the address of both Houses of Parliament, it may be lawful to remove them; that no pardon under the great seal of England be pleadable to an impeachment by the Commons in Parliament. Having settled these preliminaries; they resolved, that the Princess Sophia, Electress and Duchess-Dowager of Hanover, be declared the next in succession to the crown of England, in the Protestant line, after His Majesty and the Princess, and the heirs of their bodies respectively; and that the further limitation of the crown be to the said Princess Sophia, and the heirs of her body, being Protestants. A bill being formed on these resolutions, was sent up to the House of Lords, where it met with some opposition from the Marquis of Normanby. A protest was likewise entered against it by the Earls of Hunt-

ingdon and Plymouth, and the Lords Guildford and Jefferies. Nevertheless, it passed without amendments, and on the twelfth day of June received the royal assent. The King was extremely mortified at the preliminary limitations, which he considered as an open insult on his own conduct and administration; but they were necessary precautions, naturally suggested by the experience of those evils to which the nation had been already exposed, in consequence of raising a foreign prince to the throne of England. As the Tories lay under the imputation of favouring the late King's interest, they exerted themselves zealously on this occasion, to wipe off the aspersion, and insinuate themselves into the confidence of the people; hoping that in the sequel they should be able to restrain the nation from engaging too deeply in the affairs of the Continent, without incurring the charge of disaffection to the present King and government." This is the account given us by Smollet of the motives which influenced the House of Commons when the Act of Settlement was passed.

I think the conduct of the Tories on this occasion completely vindicates them from that aspersion which has been industriously thrown on them, that they were indifferent to the liberties of England. The regulations which they thus proposed not only evince their solicitude for our free constitution, but also their sagacity in suggesting those defences which were most likely to protect us from the mischiefs consequent on the establishment of a dynasty possessing foreign dominions; and if we consider the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement as consolidated into one act, and the law of England as it stood after such consolidation, I think an Englishman could hardly desire a better security against the invasion of his political interests. For it is to be remembered, that, by an act passed during the reign of King William, no Parliament could sit for a longer term than three years; so that, at the time when the Act of Settlement was framed, the law for Triennial Parliaments was in existence.

It is also to be observed, that, at the same period, every member of Parliament was

considered as entitled to submit his political opinions to his countrymen, without being subjected to any prosecution for libel. I assume this to have been the law of the land, from the decision in the court of Common Pleas, at a subsequent period, in the case of John Wilkes.

I will take a short review of the law of England as it then stood. 1st. No member of either House of Parliament was punishable for any expressions used in the House, except by the order of the House itself. And, as at that time the privilege of Parliament protected members of both Houses from being punishable in courts of law for libel, the full liberty of discussing all political subjects, both in and out of Parliament, was preserved to every member, subject only to the control of that House to which he belonged.

During the proceedings of government against Mr. Wilkes, the two Houses broke down this barrier. For after the court of Common Pleas had set Mr. Wilkes at liberty, upon the ground that his privilege as

a member of the House of Commons protected him from being punishable for libel in a court of law, yet the two Houses, corruptly desirous of assisting the King's ministers in the completion of their oppressive designs, voted that privilege of Parliament did not extend to the case of libel. I think there is much ground for doubting whether the two Houses could, by such vote, abridge the privilege of Parliament; and whether a court of law is not, even at this day, obliged to recognize the member's privilege in matters of libel. When the court of Common Pleas set Mr. Wilkes at liberty, saying that his privilege as a member of the House of Commons precluded them from examining the subject, did they decide agreeably to the law, or did they decide erroneously? It has never been adjudged, or even suggested in any court of law, that they decided erroneously, as the law at that time stood. But the law of Parliament is part of the common law of England; and like every other part of the common law I do not see how it could be altered, except by the concurrence of the three branches of the legislature: in other words, how it could have been altered

except by a statute. If the courts of common law recognize that the votes of the two Houses have altered the law of Parliament without the concurrence of the King, they must admit that, on the subject of privilege, the two Houses have legislative power without the King's assent. I have also no scruple in saying, that the vote of the House of Commons, on this subject, restrained the member of that House from the exercise of his duties. For the language used in the House is not to be viewed as language confined within those walls. The opinions there delivered are to be considered as spoken to the country, they are to influence the judgment and the wishes of the country; and this cannot be effected, if the member is restrained from publishing his political opinions. If those publications are injurious to the country, either the House itself may punish its member, or direct the Attorney-General to file an information *ex officio*; but as the law is now held to be, since this vote of the House of Commons in the case of Mr. Wilkes, the Attorney-General has the superintendance of all those political opinions which any member may

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choose to disclose to his constituents. This is repugnant to what was intended to have been established by the Bill of Rights. If those opinions are unfriendly to the principles of liberty, but subservient to the views of the ministers, the Attorney-General, who is appointed by those ministers, will not prosecute; but if the opinions published are unfriendly to the ministers, the Attorney-General will oppress the member by his prosecution. Apply this doctrine to the late prosecution of Sir Francis Burdett by the Attorney-General, for the opinions which he published respecting the proceedings at Manchester on the 16th August, 1819.

Let it also be remarked, that, at the time when the Act of Settlement was framed, property and patronage in boroughs were scarcely in existence. From the Revolution in 1688, to the death of Queen Anne in 1714, the House of Commons was influenced either by the Tory party, or by that of the Whigs. Sir Robert Walpole governed the country by uniting the influence of the crown to the Whig party;

and the plan that individuals should acquire influence in boroughs, either by property, or patronage, seems not to have been adopted antecedently to the Pelhams coming into administration. From that hour, this species of influence has been continually increasing; and the ministers of the crown have no means of resisting it, except by augmenting the profusion in the public expenditure.

Mr. Burke has said in some of his writings, that the plan of an interior cabinet was formed during the lifetime of Frederick Prince of Wales. If by this expression is meant, that the Prince of Wales had formed the idea of being his own minister, I can easily believe that Mr. Burke's suggestion is well founded. That the King should be his own minister, was a sentiment congenial to a German prince; but it is wholly inconsistent with the character of an English King. By the principles of the English constitution, there are to be ministers responsible for every public measure; and from thence the maxim, "The King can do no wrong." Those who framed the Act of

Settlement in the thirteenth of King William, by which the Brunswick family was called to the succession, were probably apprehensive that this German family would either not be aware of this principle, or not be disposed implicitly to conform to it. They, therefore, introduced into that act the following clause: "That from and after the time that the further limitation by this act shall take effect, all matters and things, which are properly cognizable in the privy council by the laws and customs of this realm, shall be transacted there; and all resolutions taken thereupon shall be signed by such of the privy council as shall advise and consent to the same."

The signature by the members of the privy council has since been dispensed with by a subsequent act of Parliament; but the clause itself sufficiently shows, that those who succeeded to the crown by force of the Act of Settlement were not to be their own ministers; but were to conduct public affairs by the intervention of ministers, responsible to the country. And let it be remembered, that this principle is thus re-

cognized in that fundamental Act of Settlement, under which the Brunswicks claim the crown.

I ought to remark that this regulation, so wisely introduced by the Tories into the Act of Settlement, was repealed by the Whigs in the 4th of Anne.

There is another circumstance of much importance, on which the provisions in the Act of Settlement will enable us to form a correct opinion. It is reported, that certain statesmen of great eminence have declared in Parliament, that the people of England are as much bound to defend Hanover, as they are to defend Hampshire; but this opinion is ill founded. The provision I allude to in the Act of Settlement is in these words: "That in case the crown and imperial dignity of this realm shall hereafter come to any person not being a native of this kingdom of England, this nation be not obliged to engage in any war for the defence of any dominions or territories *which do not belong to the crown of England*,

without the consent of Parliament." I am aware of the expression *not being a native of this kingdom of England*, and that it may be contended that this provision was to have effect only while royalty was possessed by a person not born in this country, and that the provision, therefore, ceased to operate after the death of George II.; but this argument cannot influence our opinions. It is recited in the statute, that these foreign dominions *do not belong to the crown of England*; they are not, therefore, parcel of those dominions or territories which the King of England is bound to defend. If from the accession of a prince, by force of the Act of Settlement, his German possessions were to be considered parcel of the dominions of Great Britain, it would have been the King's duty to employ the whole force of the British empire in their defence; and this clause would have been an unwarrantable restraint on that duty. This declaratory provision was manifestly introduced to protect the people of England from being involved in the defence of the dominions of the Elector of Hanover.

There is another clause in the Act of Settlement which sufficiently shows that His Majesty's German dominions are not to be considered as united to Great Britain. By a clause in this act, the King is prohibited from going out of the dominions of England, Scotland, or Ireland, without consent of Parliament. If Hanover was to be considered as united to Great Britain by the King's accession, this clause would have been absurd and unjust.

There is another provision in the Act of Settlement, which, unfortunately for the people of this country, has been so construed, as to deprive us of all that protection against the undue influence of the crown which the framers of that statute intended to establish. The provision is in these words: "That no person, who has an office, or place of profit under the king, or receives a pension from the crown, shall be capable of serving as a member of the House of Commons." This provision in the statute has been construed to extend only to those offices which have been created since the act was framed. It has

also been construed to extend only to those pensions which are revocable at the pleasure of the crown; and it has also been ruled, that the person to whom such office, place of profit, or pension, is granted, may be re-elected to serve in the same Parliament. By these various constructions, this provision in the statute has been rendered nugatory.

There is another inroad on this provision, which the ministers now seem desirous of making; for it has been contended, in a late debate, that, although the place of President of the Board of Control is a place created since the Act of Settlement, yet as the gentleman on whom it has been recently conferred receives no salary, it is not an office, or place of profit, within this provision of the statute. But I cannot accede to this argument: the words used in the provision are manifestly not synonymous, but disjunctive, viz. office, place of profit, or pension. The expression, place of profit, was probably introduced to obviate the objection, that the place granted, though of profit, was not an office. And indeed it is

a difficult matter to ascertain what in the eye of the law is strictly to be denominated an office. But the situations in the contemplation of the legislature, when the act was framed, were threefold, office, place of profit, or pension; and the place of President of the Board of Control is manifestly an office, which exercises no inconsiderable share of the executive government.

To these remarks on the constructions of this provision in the Act of Settlement, I will add only one observation more. They are constructions to prevent the redress of that mischief which the people justly complained of, and which the legislature intended to remove; the adoption of these constructions is, therefore, to be lamented. For can any proceeding be more justly called an abuse, than that where placemen and pensioners are to impose the taxes, a portion of which they are themselves afterwards to receive. Nor can this provision in the Act of Settlement be justly called a restraint on the prerogative. It was, in truth, nothing more than a restraint on the exercise of that corrupting influence in Par-

liament, by which the minister too frequently misleads his sovereign.

From the above reflections I am aware it may be inferred, that I am not an admirer of the character of King William. To the man who makes such a charge against me, I shall reply, *Habes confitentem reum.* We are indebted to King William for the first establishment of our national debt, and of a standing army in time of peace; and what Englishman is there, who is not sensible of the misery which the people of England at this moment suffer from these establishments. The Tories zealously concurred in placing King William and Queen Mary on the throne. Whatever hesitation they might have had from the old doctrine of non-resistance, their scruples gave way to their love of civil and religious liberty; but they did not wish that such heavy taxes should be permanently imposed on the people of England, for the gratification of King William in his continental wars. The Tories composed the landed interest: they and their posterity were to bear these permanent burdens: it

is not wonderful therefore, that they hesitated, before they consented to impose them. The Whigs did not possess so large a share of the landed property; they, therefore, did not view these permanent taxes with the same aversion. The practice of funding, and of imposing taxes to pay the interest, had long prevailed in Holland. It was acceptable to the existing generation, because they felt the burden of the interest only, instead of the principal; and probably much of the money, during the reign of King William, was advanced by foreigners and Jews, who received larger interest from the newly created English funds than they could obtain in any other country.

The war, on account of the Spanish succession, had been resolved on before the close of King William's life. The design was persevered in by Queen Anne, through the influence of the Duke of Marlborough. This nobleman must be viewed as having succeeded to that situation which had been occupied by King William. He was, by political connexions, a Tory; but he saw that the Whigs would be more disposed to

advance money for the continuance of the war than his former friends; he, therefore, changed his party; and although Queen Anne had a preference for the Tories, yet the sway which the Duchess of Marlborough possessed over the mind of the Queen, preserved for a long time, the Duke's influence from being diminished. The Queen was awakened at last to the consequences of the heavy burdens imposed upon her subjects, and she resolved to terminate the war. In effecting this, she was embarrassed by the Whigs; whose power was much increased, not only by the great ability of their leaders, but from their long continuance in office, and uninterrupted distribution of patronage. The latter years of her life were years of affliction. She cannot be called a great Queen; but viewed as an individual, every part of her life merits our esteem and partiality.

The three first sovereigns of the Brunswick line have followed the footsteps of King William. Continental wars, an augmentation of the national debt, and a standing army uniformly increasing, have distin-

guished their successive reigns; till, at length, we have been brought to consider a national debt, and a standing army, as forming part of our constitution. And we hear, without astonishment, of forty-four millions sterling employed to pay the interest of our debt, and eleven millions sterling demanded for the army in time of peace.

NOTES.

NOTES.

Note 1.—Page 2.

At the common law commissions were granted to the Judges *durante bene placito.* By the Act of Settlement, 13th William III., it was enacted, That commissions should be granted to the Judges *quamdiu se bene gesserint.* George II., while Prince of Wales, had been displeased with some of the Judges, for the opinion which they had given on a dispute between him and his father, respecting the guardianship of George the Second's children: and, as by the death of George I. all commissions granted by him were terminated, it was necessary that new commissions should be granted to the Judges by George II. The Act of Settlement com-

pelled the King to grant commissions to the Judges *quamdiu se bene gesserint*, but it did not compel him to grant those commissions to the men who had been Judges in his father's reign; and George II. refused to grant new commissions to those Judges who had offended him. At the accession of George III., those who had the most influence about the young King, had a wish to throw reproach upon the memory of George II.; the King, therefore, was prevailed on to recommend to Parliament to enact, That every succeeding King should grant new commissions to those who had held the office of Judge in the preceding reign. The courtiers of George III. have trumpeted this conduct as a singular mark of George the Third's disposition to diminish his power; but in fact George III. increased his power by this measure: having no dislike to those whom he found in office, he had renewed their commissions. By the statute which he thus procured to be enacted, he rendered those Judges whom he might himself afterwards appoint, irremoveable by his successor; and thus, instead of diminishing his power, he increased it.

I do not mean to vindicate the conduct of George II. in refusing to grant new commissions to those gentlemen who had been Judges in his father's reign. I will even admit that his conduct on this occasion was injudicious; but the manner in which the subject was brought forward in Parliament, and the elaborate praises bestowed upon the young King on this occasion, flowed from the malevolence which had been cultivated at the Court of Leicester House against the deceased Monarch; and which was not terminated even by his death.

NOTE 2.—Page 2.

The Earl of Hardwicke was certainly a very able magistrate. He was a very honest man, under a most craving appetite; extreme avarice. I have heard the late Lord Thurlow say, that he thought the Earl of Hardwicke was more able as Chief Justice of the King's Bench, than he was as Lord Chancellor; but I could never discover on what ground Lord Thurlow entertained this opinion. The Earl of Hardwicke was un-

fortunate in having his decisions badly reported: Tracey Atkyns was a bad reporter; Vezey was not much better.

It may not be improper to subjoin the character of the Earl of Hardwicke, as given by Lord Waldegrave. "He was undoubtedly an excellent Chancellor; and might have been thought a great man, had he been less avaricious, less proud, less unlike a gentleman, and not so great a politician."

Every one must see that this character was not drawn by a friendly hand. That the Earl of Hardwicke desired to accumulate private wealth, is most certainly true; but let it be remembered, that he was not even suspected of having ever acquired money by incorrect means; he had received no fortune from his parents; all the wealth which he possessed was acquired, either by his profession, or by the great offices which he had held, and accumulated by means of his frugality. Let it also be recollected, that he had five sons and two daughters, who were all to be presented in

society with that degree of opulence which is required for the children of a Peer. I have also heard it said, that although the Earl of Hardwicke practised much frugality in his private life; yet whenever he presented himself on public business, no man was more observant of the splendour which suited the occasion. He certainly may be reckoned among our greatest and most spotless lawyers.

The Earl of Hardwicke has also been abused for the Marriage Act; and I think with some reason: his mistake was an incautions departure from the common law. The common law had established, That where the male was under fourteen, and the female under twelve, at the time the marriage was celebrated, the parties might avoid the marriage after the age of disability was passed; but if they lived together as man and wife, after the age of disability was passed, it had always been held that the marriage became valid and unavoidable. But in the Marriage Act introduced by the Earl of Hardwicke, it was unfortunately enacted, That where either of the parties

was under the age at which marriage was allowed without the consent of parents or guardians, a marriage celebrated without the consent of parents or guardians should be deemed actually void; from whence it followed, that no subsequent cohabitation could render it valid. This departure from the common law has been productive of much calamity to many individuals; as children have been declared illegitimate, and incapable of inheriting, where parents had cohabited thirty years subsequently to a marriage supposed to have been lawful.

Note 3.—Page 18.

The Earl of Northington had been an attendant at the Court of Leicester House. He was well read in the common law. When the Great Seal was committed to him, he had for some years only the rank of Lord Keeper; and not being a Peer, he could not defend his own decrees in the Court of Chancery, when they were brought before the House of Lords by way of appeal. Some of his decisions were perhaps injudiciously reversed. I will only mention

one: it was his decision in the case of Drury *v.* Drury. The statute of 27th Henry VIII. cap. 10. had authorized a woman to bar herself of her dower by the acceptance of a jointure, antecedently to her marriage. This provision in the 27th Henry VIII. was necessary; because, by the common law, a woman could not bar herself of her expectant dower, the common law not permitting rights to be released until they come into existence. And probably the Earl of Northington thought, that the only object of the Legislature in introducing this clause into the statute, was to enable a woman to bar herself of this expectant right.

The Earl of Northington, then Lord Keeper Henley, was of opinion, that the meaning of the statute was, that a woman who was of an age to contract, might thus bind herself; but that the statute had never intended, that a woman who was an infant, and consequently not able to contract, should thus preclude herself from her right. The Earl of Hardwicke, influenced, perhaps, by a wish to prevent the estates of the great

families from being broken, procured the repeal of this decree in the House of Lords. I do not presume to say that the Earl of Hardwicke acted erroneously; but the consequence of this decision is, that a female infant may relinquish her rights, at an age at which a male infant is not considered as possessing sufficient discretion to bind himself.

NOTE 4.—Page 25.

Earl Temple possessed at one time a considerable degree of popularity; he owed it to his connexion with his brother-in-law, Mr. Secretary Pitt. Leonidas Glover speaks with much approbation of Earl Temple's conduct in December 1756, in going down to the House of Lords, while labouring under a severe fit of sickness, to oppose a clause of thanks to the King for having introduced the German Auxiliaries. I think the conduct of Earl Temple, on this occasion, was peevish and ill-timed. These German troops had been sent for over in consequence of addresses from the two Houses; it was, therefore, but properly re-

spectful that his Majesty should be thanked for his compliance with the request of Parliament. It was certainly an unnecessary opposition, and probably proceeded from the noble Earl's self-importance having been offended, at the admission of this clause into the address without his previous approbation.

Earl Temple's character seems to be fairly given by Lord Waldegrave. He tells us, that George II. had a decided aversion to him. That the noble Earl had a pert familiarity not agreeable to majesty; and that on some occasions, he had used an insolence of expression which the King could never forgive. On the removal of the Marquis of Rockingham in 1766, George III. authorized Mr. Pitt to form an Administration. Under this authority Mr. Pitt applied to his brother-in-law, Earl Temple; and from the accounts of that negotiation which have reached us, Mr. Pitt seems to have allotted the place of First Lord of the Treasury to the noble Earl; but Earl Temple seems to have demanded more power in the selection of his colleagues,

than Mr. Pitt was disposed to allow: the negotiation failed. The two brothers-in-law separated, and I believe were never afterwards re-united.

Note 5.—Page 28.

I have said that Lord Mansfield was a very able lawyer, and that he decided questions of property with great integrity. A circumstance occurred in the Session 1766-67, which manifested, in a remarkable manner, his great superiority over Lord Camden in legal knowledge, as well as in powers of reasoning. The Administration formed under the auspices of the Earl of Chatham in the summer 1766, had judged it necessary during the recess of Parliament, to issue a proclamation, laying an embargo on the exportation of wheat. When the Parliament met, those who wished to humiliate the Ministers, observed, that although the measure might be necessary, yet the embargo was a direct violation of the law of the land; inasmuch as wheat had not risen to that price which authorized the King to

prohibit the exportation. They accompanied this remark with an offer of a Bill of Indemnity. I know not how it happened, but the friends of the Administration were averse to this offer. They at last accepted it as far as regarded inferior agents; but they rejected the proposal, as far as it related to those members of the Privy Council who had signed the proclamation. When this limited Bill of Indemnity was sent from the Commons to the Lords, Lord Mansfield showed the necessity of amending the Bill, by extending the indemnity to the Members of the Privy Council. He asserted that, by the law of England, the King had no dispensing power. That the argument which had been advanced, *salus populi est suprema lex*, that when the public safety rendered it expedient, the power of dispensing with the law must be somewhere lodged; and that this power of dispensation could only be lodged with the Crown; was an argument destructive of the Constitution. That if the King could dispense with one Act of Parliament, he might dispense with every Act. That the plea of necessity might as fully justify the raising money without the consent of Par-

liament, as it could the present proclamation dispensing with a Statute.

Lord Mansfield's arguments on this occasion were founded on the true principles of our Constitution: they could not be answered by Lord Camden; he shrunk before his antagonist. I do not mean by this to speak of Lord Camden as an inconsiderable man; but he was not equal to Lord Mansfield, either in legal knowledge, or in powers of reasoning. As a speaker, Lord Camden possessed one beauty beyond any man I ever heard; his style and his delivery were little above those of private conversation. He seemed to be arguing with a friend, rather than contending with an adversary; it was the *mitis sapientia Lælii.* By Lord Mansfield, on the contrary, while his health permitted it, every thing was done with effort. On the occasion to which I have alluded, he rode the great horse *Liberty* with much applause. I will add one remark more. The Administration formed in the summer 1766, was supposed to be founded on the exalted characters of the Earl of Chatham and Lord Camden. This failure

in their first political measure, blemished their reputation; perhaps it paved the way for their downfal: but the ill health of the Earl of Chatham, which began in the winter 1766--7, occasioned his removal from the council-table; and from that time he was in effect no longer minister.

I hesitate to say any thing respecting the eloquence of the late Earl of Chatham. I have already mentioned the terms in which it is described by his contemporary, Mr. Glover. For myself, I never heard the Earl of Chatham but once; that was on the subject of Falkland Island, in 1771. The effects of his eloquence seemed to arise from sudden bursts, which surprised and terrified his hearers, rather than from any continued chain of reasoning: it was a style fitted more for offensive, than for defensive purposes; more suited to the House of Commons, than to the House of Lords; it was a style peculiar to himself, eminently and visibly artificial. On the Falkland Island question, the Earl of Chatham wished to engage the country in a war. We are in-

debted to George III. for having protected us from this calamity.

Note 6.—Page 61.

During the session of 1783–4, I voted with the Coalition Ministers. I am not conscious that I was influenced by any motives of private interest; but when I recollect the measures which I supported, I cannot help being astonished, that I did not feel how much those measures infringed the principles of our Constitution. To explain this subject completely, it is necessary to give some account of the origin and character of the East India Company. This company was originally established for no other purposes than those of commerce. On the downfal of the Mogul empire, they assumed an importance which had never before been thought of: they acquired some dominion in the Carnatic; but their great and valuable acquisitions arose from the defeat of Surajah Dowlah, the Nabob of Bengal. In consequence of the victory at Plassy, much wealth was acquired for the company, as well as for its servants, civil

and military. From this hour, the company assumed a political character: its commerce with Indostan gradually ceased to be profitable, when viewed only as commerce. It was useful chiefly as the means of transmitting the wealth of India for the service of the company, and of her servants at home and abroad. The company became a Republic. The proprietors of stock were the citizens of that Republic, and the directors the senate, through which the company conducted its affairs. While the India company had remained purely a commercial company, individuals had invested property in their stock, with a view to the profit to be derived from dividends; but when the company assumed a political character, property was purchased in that stock as the means of serving those friends and relations whom the proprietors had in India. The proprietors became a political body; a share in the patronage became the object of every stockholder. This republic was an empire within an empire: it stood in need of protection from the nation; and in granting this protection, it is not wonderful that the Ministers, at different periods;

availed themselves of the company's necessities to usurp a portion of the patronage. During the latter periods of the Roman republic, governors of provinces courted the people at home, with a view to the maintenance of their power and authority abroad. The same policy was adopted by those servants whom the company employed in India: they acquired an influence among the directors; and as there were many occasions on which the opinion of the directors could be controuled by a court of proprietors, they extended their attention to the obtaining influence among the proprietors. About 1781, two committees were appointed by the House of Commons, to examine into the conduct of the company's servants in India. The secret committee, of which Mr. Henry Dundas was the chairman, was appointed on the recommendation of Lord North; the select committee, of which General Richard Smith was the chairman, derived its establishment from the suggestion of Mr. Burke: both committees were appointed for the same avowed purpose,— to bring to light the delinquency of the company's servants abroad;

perhaps both were established from a desire to obtain a share in India patronage. Neither of these committees made any report till after Lord North had been removed from office; but after the removal of Lord North, and the appointment of that administration which was composed of Rockinghams and Shelburnes, both committees made their reports. They concurred in stating much malversation by the servants of the company in India. The secret committee directed its accusations chiefly against Sir Thomas Rumbold; the select committee principally against Mr. Hastings. But nothing was done on the reports of these committees during that session, which closed in July 1782; in the ensuing session of 1782–3, there were no proceedings on India subjects; but in the following session, in November 1783, Mr. Fox brought forward his India Bill. He proposed, by this bill, that the whole power, both of the directors and of the court of proprietors, should be vested for the term of four years in seven gentlemen, to be nominated by the House of Commons. The trade of the company was to be under

the management of eight other persons, subject to the superintendence of the seven principal directors. The measure was bold; it annihilated the political importance both of the directors, and the proprietors, and transferred the power and patronage to the friends of those Ministers who were at that time in office. While this bill was depending in the House of Commons, the objections made to it were chiefly rested on this ground, — that it was a violation of the chartered rights of the India company, confirmed to them by Parliament. But after the bill had been carried to the House of Lords, the objection was of a different character: it was there remarked, that when the power and patronage of India were vested for the term of four years, in the friends of those Ministers who were at that time in office, those Ministers would in effect become irremovable by the King; for who, it was asked, would undertake the management of public affairs, when those who quitted office, and who would consequently form an opposition to the measures of their successors, possessed the whole government and patronage of India? The

manner in which those gentlemen who were at that time in office had obtained their situations, was strongly remarked on: it was observed, that by a confederacy, they had been able to compel the Earl of Shelburne to resign his situation; in consequence of which the King had ultimately, and after much hesitation, been obliged to confide to them the administration.

Mr. Fox's bill was thrown out in the House of Lords: the leaders of the coalition said they had certain intelligence that Earl Temple, in an audience which he had obtained of the King, had recommended to His Majesty, to use his efforts to resist this bill in the House of Lords; that he had prevailed on the King to adopt his advice, and that the King had authorized Earl Temple to use his name to those Peers who were likely to be influenced in their votes by the knowledge of His Majesty's opinion. No evidence of this transaction was laid before the House of Commons; but the assertion that such an interference by the King had existed, was, from the rumour, assumed to be true, and acted on as proved. All the

subsequent measures were built on this foundation. The leaders of the coalition contended, that, by the principles of our Constitution, the King can have no knowledge of any measure while depending in either House of Parliament; that, on this principle, the King ought not to have heard Earl Temple on the subject; still less ought he to have authorized that noble Lord to signify His Majesty's opinion to other Peers. This doctrine was assumed to be incontrovertible; yet, on reflection, I cannot help thinking that it is a position of the solidity of which much doubt may be entertained. Earl Temple, as a Peer, was an hereditary counsellor of the King; and, as such, was entitled to demand an audience on any subject which concerned the public interest: with this right to demand an audience, are we prepared to say, that the Peer had not a right to give his opinion to the King in private? Why has the Peer a right to demand an audience, if he is precluded from giving his opinion at that audience? The powers of the House of Commons, of the House of Lords, and of the King, are distinct; but it does not follow that they are

to have no knowledge of each other's proceedings. It may be said, that the King was to wait till the Bill was presented to him, and that he might then have refused his assent. I think that the King has this prerogative of refusing his assent; but let it be remembered, that others have doubted whether he has this power, and that there has been no instance of any King having exercised it since the reign of King William; and I believe that monarch never exercised this prerogative except on one occasion. But is it not more beneficial to the State, that the King should, by his influence in the House of Lords, prevent a bill from being adopted, than that he should wait till it had passed both Houses, and then crush it by the prerogative of refusal. Since the Revolution in 1688, prerogative has been exchanged for influence; and while we admit such boundless influence to be exercised by the Minister, are we to refuse all personal influence to the King himself? Constitutional principles are not to be pressed to such an extent as to create inconvenience. Those who think that a Minister possesses at this day

too great an influence in the Houses of Parliament, would not wish ministerial influence to be entirely extinguished. The three branches of the legislature are to act together, and the ball to move from the impulse of their joint direction. It might, perhaps, have been proved, that Earl Temple had demanded an audience of the King: what advice he gave the King could not be proved; and though it was asserted, that Earl Temple had expressed His Majesty's opinion to individual Peers, yet no proof whatever of this was produced before the House of Commons. Earl Temple, through his brother, Mr. William Grenville, denied the fact, and offered to meet the accusation. On this basis, of the assertion of the King's interference through Earl Temple, though unsupported by any evidence, all the subsequent proceedings of the House of Commons were grounded.

The peculiar circumstances in which the coalitionists stood, ought also not to be disregarded. In the spring 1782, those who wished for the termination of the war with America, had obtained a decided ma-

jority in the House of Commons over those who wished for the continuance of the contest. The leaders of the victorious party were the Marquis of Rockingham, and the Earl of Shelburne. An administration was formed consisting of five Rockinghams and five Shelburnes; to whom the King joined the Chancellor, Lord Thurlow, who had uniformly been an advocate for the war. In June, 1782, the Marquis of Rockingham, who had been first lord of the treasury, died. The King immediately appointed the Earl of Shelburne to be his successor. Mr. Edmund Burke contended, that the acceptance of this office was a gross breach of faith in the Earl of Shelburne; as the two parties of Rockingham and Shelburne had mutually engaged to each other, that neither should solicit any favour from the King without the previous approbation of the other. I do not know whether any such engagement ever existed. I believe that its existence was denied by the Earl of Shelburne; but if such an engagement had subsisted, it was not unreasonable to say, that the engagement was terminated by the death of Lord Rock-

ingham. Mr. Edmund Burke had sufficient influence with Mr. Fox to prevail on him to urge with his party, that this conduct of Lord Shelburne was a breach of faith. The Duke of Richmond would not concur in this disapprobation of the conduct of Lord Shelburne; and when Mr. Fox and Lord John Cavendish resigned their situations on the ground of this faithless conduct in Lord Shelburne, the Duke of Richmond and Lord Keppel, the other two members of the cabinet who were of the Rockingham party, continued in office. It is manifest that this separation of Mr. Fox from the Earl of Shelburne was solely on private grounds. No public act of Lord Shelburne was censured. Mr. Fox himself had no sentiment of unkindness to Lord Shelburne: but Mr. Burke had sufficient influence over Mr. Fox to prevail on him, not only to separate from the Earl of Shelburne, but also to relinquish his connexion with his uncle, the Duke of Richmond, who took part with Lord Shelburne on this occasion. The Rockinghams and Shelburnes being thus separated, there were three parties in the House of Commons; the Rock-

inghams, the Shelburnes, and the party which adhered to Lord North. Every one saw, that whichever two of these parties united, they would overpower the third. This union took place at the end of the year; and the Earl of Shelburne, who had concluded a peace, was compelled to resign his situation. This resignation was certainly against the wishes of the King; but His Majesty had not the means of relieving himself, and he was compelled to receive the coalitionists as his ministers. They came into office in the spring 1783. In November, 1783, the bill, called Mr. Fox's India Bill, was brought into Parliament; but when men began to see, that the power and patronage acquired to the coalitionists by this bill, would render them almost irremovable from office, we cannot wonder that those who were of this opinion, advised the King to resist the measure; nor can we be surprised that the King was willing to follow their advice. The coalition ministers were removed, and Mr. Pitt and his friends appointed to succeed them.

No proof of the interference either of the King, or of Earl Temple, was laid before the House of Commons. But the fact was assumed as proved; and on this assumption, all the addresses to the King, for the removal of his new ministers, were grounded. I will shortly enumerate what the various proceedings were. Mr. Fox first moved for a committee of the whole House on the state of the nation; in this committee he proposed an address to the King, praying that His Majesty would take no step which might preclude the House from adopting those plans which were necessary for the government of India. To this address the King gave a gracious answer. The House was then adjourned for the Christmas holidays. When they met again, on the 12th January, 1784, the first measure proposed by Mr. Fox, was the re-appointment of the committee on the state of the nation; in this committee, several addresses to the King for the removal of his ministers were resolved on. On the presentation of these several addresses, the King returned gracious an-

swers; but uniformly refused to comply with the request, assigning as a reason, that no complaint was alleged against the conduct of any of his ministers. I will not recapitulate these various addresses; but the most important act adopted by the Opposition, was a string of resolutions moved by Lord Charles Spencer on the 16th January, in which the House of Commons resolved, that the ministers had come into office under such circumstances as precluded the House from having any confidence in them. The Opposition retained their majority; they threatened to suspend the Mutiny Bill, and to stop the appropriation of the supplies. Both parties manifestly stood in awe of each other: the Opposition apprehensive of a dissolution, and the ministers fearing lest the Opposition should carry into effect those measures which they had threatened. In this situation, the King did not conceal his wish for a reconciliation between the parties. A number of members assembled at the St. Alban's Tavern, for the avowed purpose of endeavouring to procure a union between the two parties. Mr. Thomas Grosvenor was chosen to be the

chairman of this assembly. The members who met at the St. Alban's, were some few of them friends of the coalitionists, but the far greater number were friends of the new minister; and though the leaders of the Opposition professed to treat this meeting with respect, yet it was well known that they did not wish their friends to attend it. This assembly endeavoured to effectuate the King's wish for a union between the parties, and proposed a conference between the Duke of Portland and Mr. Pitt. Mr. Pitt gave a ready consent to this conference; but the Duke of Portland met the proposal, at the outset, with this objection, that he could not confer with a minister, in whom the House of Commons had declared they placed no confidence. The King condescended to request the Duke of Portland to attend him. The Duke of Portland sent for answer, that though he should be at all times happy to attend His Majesty, he could not meet Mr. Pitt as minister. The following method of getting over this difficulty was at last adopted: — the King sent the Duke of Portland a message, requesting him to

meet Mr. Pitt for the purpose of forming an administration; and it was suggested to his Grace, that he might very fairly consider this message as tantamount to a declaration, that Mr. Pitt was no longer minister. The Duke consented to view it in this light; and Mr. Pitt wrote a letter to his Grace, offering to meet him, for the purpose of arranging an administration on fair and equal terms. I have mentioned, in my Recollections, that Mr. Fox did not choose to come to town from St. Ann's Hill, on the morning on which this letter was to be taken into consideration, and an answer transmitted to Mr. Pitt. I have imputed this conduct of Mr. Fox to indolence: perhaps in this I have been mistaken; perhaps he knew that there was a strong wish in Mr. Burke, that the union between the parties should not take place, unless it were preceded by Mr. Pitt's resignation; but such a resignation would have been, on the part of Mr. Pitt, unconditional submission. It would even have amounted to an acknowledgment, that circumstances had attended his appointment, which justified the House of Commons in saying, that they

could have no confidence in him. The minister, therefore, determined not to make the previous resignation thus demanded. When Mr. Pitt's letter was taken into consideration at the Duke of Portland's, Mr. Burke framed the answer for his Grace, requesting an explanation of the expression, *fair and equal terms.* This protracted the negociation; addresses to the King were poured in, thanking him for the removal of the late ministers, and for the appointment of the present. Mr. Pitt's courage revived, and he broke off the treaty; the superiority which the Opposition had continued to possess in the House of Commons gradually diminished; the last question which they brought forward was carried only by the majority of one vote. The contest could not be continued any further; the Opposition did not venture to stop the Mutiny bill; and the supplies having been voted, though the usual appropriation act had not been passed, the minister did not hesitate to apply them to the several services for which they had been granted. The dissolution then took place, and the elections of members, in the ensuing Parliament,

sufficiently declared the victory to be on the side of the King and Mr. Pitt.

I have thus detailed the progress and close of the discussions on Mr. Fox's India bill. Gratitude to those who had procured the termination of the American war, led me to vote with Mr. Fox and his party; and I believe that many others were influenced by the same sentiment. In the heat of the contest there was little time for reflection; but when the fight was over, and the people had declared against the late majority in the House of Commons, men were naturally led to consider what consequences must have followed if the coalitionists had obtained the victory. They had demanded the removal of Mr. Pitt, assigning for a reason, that he had obtained his situation under circumstances, which precluded him from possessing the confidence of the House of Commons. As no proof of these circumstances was laid before the House, this demand, of the removal of Mr. Pitt, amounted in effect to a claim on the part of the House of Commons, to

negative the King's choice of a minister. Could they have established this right to a *negative*, it is manifest that they must soon have acquired the *affirmative* right of appointment; for if one minister had relinquished his office in obedience to the will of the House of Commons, it was obvious that no other minister would have accepted the situation, unless he had been assured of the approbation of the House. The King fought for the most important of all his prerogatives, the nomination of his ministers; and Mr. Pitt protected the principles of the constitution from violation, when he refused to make that previous resignation which the Duke of Portland had demanded.

I am aware that Mr. Fox was disposed, by his habits of life, to love the deep stake, and the rash game; but I have always attributed the measures of this political campaign to the arrogance and violence of Mr. Burke. The Duke of Portland was wholly under his guidance; and I firmly believe, that every measure adopted by the party was dictated by Mr. Burke.

Lord North was willing to yield to whatever his friends might desire from him. In one of the debates in the House of Commons, Mr. Powys, the member for Northamptonshire, applied to Lord North that celebrated expression, which Cicero was accused of having employed with reference to Octavius Cæsar: *Egregius Juvenis, laudandus, et tollendus.* I recollect the spirited answer of Lord North. He said he was perfectly able to translate the honourable member's Latin; but he would have that honourable gentleman to know, that he did not choose to be kicked up stairs. By this repartee he alluded to the wish of some gentlemen, that he should be removed out of the way by being called up to the House of Peers. But notwithstanding this answer, Lord North, through the whole proceeding, was ready to acquiesce in any measure desired by his party.

On the meeting of the new Parliament, Mr. Pitt appeared to have obtained so decisive a majority that Mr. Fox's abilities produced little effect. The violence of the preceding Session had sunk his reputation

with the people; and Mr. Pitt, from the spring 1784, to the close of the year 1792, conducted public affairs with little opposition, and much success. He brought the finances into order, and adopted plans of retrenchment most beneficial to the country. Who is there who must not now look back with approbation to that scale of expense which he had established in 1792? Who is there who must not regret that the party of the great Whig families, by going over to the King, should have compelled Mr. Pitt to consent to a crusade against French principles? But the die was cast; it terminated the glory of Mr. Pitt, and the prosperity of his country.

In the first Session of the new Parliament, which began in the summer 1784, Mr. Pitt brought in a bill for regulating the affairs of the India Company. This bill vested nearly the same powers in persons to be nominated by the King, as it had been proposed by Mr. Fox's bill should be vested in the seven directors. This was the essential difference between the two bills. And, though the partizans of Mr. Fox con-

tended that the bills were substantially the same, yet every man must see the difference between a bill, creating a power which enabled the possessors to controul the King, and a bill which increased the royal power.

In the Session 1784-85, Mr. Pitt indiscreetly involved himself in the Westminster scrutiny. He was misled on this subject, by the opinion of Sir Lloyd Kenyon, who was at that time Attorney-General; but Mr. Pitt had the good sense to relinquish the dispute. I have said, that on this question Mr. Pitt was misled by Sir Lloyd Kenyon: but let it not be supposed, from this expression, that I think slightly of the knowledge of Sir Lloyd Kenyon; perhaps he surpassed every lawyer of his time in legal learning. His powers of discussion were not equal to his knowledge; he sprung at the conclusion, without marking the steps by which he reached it; most commonly he was right; but if it happened that he was wrong, he could not trace back his steps, and see where he had been in fault. I have also said in my Recollections, that

Mr. Fox did not often *build* a speech; but that he relied on his talent to seize weak parts of his adversary's argument, and beat them to pieces. In the debate on the Westminster scrutiny, he showed how able he was to build a speech, when he would submit to the labour of giving his subject the necessary consideration. His speech on this occasion was a masterpiece of constitutional knowledge, close reasoning, and beautiful arrangement. I will add but one remark more on this great contention, which occupied the House of Commons from the beginning of November 1783, to the dissolution of Parliament in March 1784. The elections in the new Parliament afforded decisive proof, that the sense of the nation is not always expressed by the majority of the House of Commons. The victory obtained by Mr. Pitt is a memorable event, demonstrative of the necessity of a reform of Parliament. In this celebrated contest, which occupied the attention both of the House and of the nation, Mr. Burke, who was the instigator of the whole proceeding on the part of the coalition, did not feel the difference between the power of a

House of Commons elected by the people, representative of its wishes; and a House of Commons nominated by patrons and proprietors of seats, and brought together by cabal and intrigue.

I will repeat the words used by Mr. Henry Dundas during the struggle between the two parties: they are emphatically expressive of that difference of character in the House of Commons, which decided the contest. "He observed, that a House of Commons might prevail against the other House of Parliament, it might prevail against the crown and the prerogative, but in no instance could it promise itself success, when it was in open contest with the people. At present there was not a society of an hundred persons in the country, of which ninety-nine were not the firm and avowed friends of administration. In such circumstances then, was it safe for that House to levy war upon the public, and to afford room for a general opinion, that there existed a combination within those walls against the interests and the wishes of

the people? What would be the consequence of such apprehensions? All confidence in the dignity, the honour, and the justice of the House would be forfeited, and men would pass their door, not with sentiments of veneration and respect, but with expressive marks of derision and contempt." In the struggle which I have thus described, the proprietors and patrons of boroughs contended against the King, supported by the people. Their efforts failed. Should the moment ever arrive, when the crown, supported by the proprietors and patrons of boroughs, became the oppressor of the people, what consequences might be expected? If the King succeeded, and the people patiently submitted, the nation, deprived of its liberties, must lose its energetic character, and no longer retain its station among the kingdoms of the earth. But if the crown, thus supported by proprietors and patrons of boroughs, failed of success, revolution, destructive of the existing dynasty, of the usurping oligarchy, of the nobility, of the Church, and of all other establishments, would most probably be the consequence.

I have endeavoured to give a fair account of what passed in the House of Commons, from the 12th of January 1784, to the dissolution of Parliament at the close of the month of March in the same year: and I have done this the more willingly, because I think that the very important contest which took place during that period has never been fully stated to the public. Mr. Pitt's conduct on that occasion was manly and constitutional. I believe he began his political life with very honest principles, and with a sincere desire of benefiting his country; but after he had departed from the correct line, and yielded to the King's wishes of embarking the country in a crusade against French principles, from that hour George III. made himself his master, and forced him into measures to which his integrity and good sense must have been averse. But though I pay this just tribute to Mr. Pitt's memory, I still retain that opinion which I have publicly professed, that he was neither a financier, nor a statesman. The occasion on which I ventured to give this opinion, was on a debate in the House of Commons,

on the 3d January, 1798. The question before the House was the third reading of the bill for augmenting the assessed taxes. My expressions were the following: "But other circumstances lead me to doubt the sincerity of His Majesty's ministers: some of them never can have been sincere, except they have abandoned those principles which first induced them to involve us in the war. I do not believe they have abandoned those principles. I recollect the language of the Secretary at War, on a former night, viz. that if peace brought reform, that reform he should consider as revolution. As a loyal subject, the right honourable secretary cannot wish a revolution; and if he thinks reform synonymous with revolution, he cannot wish for that peace, which he and all men see, must necessarily produce reform. Some of those who are now in His Majesty's cabinet have involved the country in war, not from a dread of the power of France, but from jealousy of the Commons of England. They fear, that the Commons of England may be influenced by the example of France to claim their rights; to claim that no Peer should

interfere in the election of a member of the House of Commons; that every member in this House should sit by the election of a body of the commonalty; and that this House should become, what the law has directed it to be, the actual representative of all the Commons of England. This is a ground of terror to Peers, proprietors of boroughs; and there are some among His Majesty's ministers who are infected with this fear. The Speaker called Mr. Nicholls to order: he said, he had not interrupted the honourable gentleman, while his argument went to show, that the present bill was improper or unnecessary. The latter part of his speech had certainly no reference to that point.

"Mr. Nicholls.—Sir, I bow with reverence to your authority; but I hope I may be permitted to observe, that, in considering a tax bill, it has been usual to allow great latitude of discussion. In this case our constituents cannot themselves apply directly by petition to this House; their interests can only be protected by the exertions of their representatives. This was

the line of argument I was endeavouring to follow;—I oppose the tax, because not necessary; I think the tax not necessary, because I think the continuance of the war not necessary; I think the continuance of the war not necessary, because sincere endeavours have never yet been in vain employed to obtain peace. Why do I say that sincere endeavours have never yet been in vain employed to obtain peace? Because some among His Majesty's ministers never can have employed sincere endeavours to obtain peace, except they have relinquished those principles on which they involved us in the war; and if I may argue from the language of the Secretary at War, on a former night, when this bill was under consideration, they have not abandoned those principles.

"The Speaker. — The honourable gentleman has a right to arraign the conduct of Ministers; I should not have called him to order if he had confined his line of argument to that point. (Here several members called out, go on, go on; the Speaker said, you are in order.)

" Mr. Nicholls. — Sir, I have on a former night asserted, that Peers interfere in the election of members of this House; I have declared my opinion that such interference is a violation of the law; and I have expressed my wishes that such interference might be prevented in future. What answer have I received from the Chancellor of the Exchequer? He does not deny my assertion of fact; he does not deny my position of law; but he says, if you wish to prevent Peers from interfering in the election of members of the House of Commons, it follows as a consequence that you are ready to join the French when they invade this country. This is his logic. The right honourable Secretary at War argues more fairly; he admits my assertion of fact, but he denies my position of law; he says, the country is to be governed by a House of Commons, any number of whose members may hold their seats by the nomination of Peers; and that this is the law of the land.

" The Speaker again called to order; he said that this had no reference to the ques-

tion; which was, whether the Bill should be read a third time?

Mr. Nicholls. — Sir, in submission to your authority, I shall desist from this line of argument. Sir, there is another ground on which, as a member of this House, I feel it to be my duty to hesitate, before I assent to the proposed tax; viz. a doubt, whether, even supposing the continuance of the war to be necessary, and that we must now contend for our existence; whether, even in that case, it is expedient to trust the money to the disposal of the present minister; and whether it is not our duty to suspend the vote of the supply, and address his Majesty to remove his ministers? Sir, every event of this war has convinced me, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is a man of no abilities. (Here a laugh from the ministerial benches.) I will explain what I mean: I mean that he has no abilities to benefit his country. I have no wish to do injustice to the reputation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer; I acknowledge his talents as a debater in this House; that he possesses sarcasm, sneer,

irony, wit; above all, he possesses the happy talent of multiplying and stringing together his words in such a manner, that it is hardly possible to affix a precise meaning to his language. To this he joins a most successful knack of misrepresenting the arguments of his adversaries. I acknowledge that he has much dexterity in cheering the band of prætorians who sit round him, and who are ready to laugh whenever he gives the signal by a smile; in one word, I acknowledge that he is *maximus* as a gladiator in this political arenâ, while he is *minimus* as a statesman.

"If all which is required from a minister is the faculty of amusing this House by his speeches, I acknowledge his talents. But I recollect the expression of an Athenian statesman, Themistocles; he said he could not play on a fiddle, but he could make a little city a great state. The language of the Chancellor of the Exchequer must be the reverse of this: he can play on his fiddle, and amuse his confiding majority in this House; but he has reduced a great empire to be a little state. You judge of a

painter, of a statuary, of an architect, by their respective works. I have read of an architect (Sir Christopher Wren) who desired to be buried in a church which he had himself erected, with this epitaph, *Si quæris monumentum circumspice.* Would the Chancellor of the Exchequer wish his character, as a statesman, to be decided by this test? Is he an able war-minister? Is he a skilful financier? Is he a successful negotiator? Has he any one quality which constitutes the great statesman? His friends acknowledge that he is not an able war-minister; and how can they avoid making this acknowledgment? Beginning the war with all the powers of Europe on his side, he has so conducted it, that every ally has either abandoned us, or been subdued; while France has been exalted to a power almost beyond the dreams of ambition. View him as a financier:—the funding system exhausted by his folly, in supposing that there were no limits to the supply which the money-market could afford; a paper-money established; taxes on consumption no longer practicable; while recourse is to be had to a requisition on income, though

he himself acknowledges that this requisition will be unequal, and therefore unjust; that it will destroy the employment of the artizan, diminish the present revenue, and, by so doing, weaken the security of the stockholder. That he has, as yet, discovered no criterion for ascertaining income; and that he is under the necessity of having recourse to the establishment of an inquisitorial tribunal, inconsistent with the principles of civil liberty, repugnant to every maxim of a commercial nation, and destructive of all private happiness.

"What is he as a negotiator? He tells you himself, that he has three times attempted to make peace; always, he says, sincerely, but always unsuccessfully. View him as a statesman; begin your examination of his conduct with the commencement of the French Revolution, in the autumn 1789, when the King was carried prisoner to Paris. Sir, a great statesman would have seen, that this was a moment of no little consequence to England. He would have seen, that the French government was in a state of dissolution; in-

capable of resisting any pacific plans of the British minister; and that he had it in his power to carry into effect many measures beneficial to his country. What was the conduct of the Chancellor of the Exchequer? His first measure (in 1790) was a foolish dispute with Spain; ill-conducted, and disgracefully terminated. He wanted the wisdom to see, that this was the happy moment when Great Britain might have re-established her antient connexion with Spain, which had been interrupted by the accession of a Prince of the House of Bourbon to the sovereignty of that country. The alliance between France and Spain had been the alliance of the reigning families, not of the two nations; it would have been easy for him to have pointed out to the court of Spain, that the Bourbons being dethroned in France, it was now for the interest of Spain to look to Great Britain, and to renew its ancient, natural, and national alliance with this country.

"In the year following (1791), another foolish contest with Russia. In 1792, Austria and Prussia invaded France; the

neither assisted the invaders, nor conciliated the confidence of France. In 1793, he engaged in the war; and how has he conducted it?" One of his great political measures was the attempt to starve France; a measure which any man of the smallest reflection must have seen, would, if successful, necessarily have produced a famine in this country. If France was distressed for corn, and this country abounded, it was obvious that France would draw grain from this country, by the assistance of the smuggler. While, on the other hand, if both countries wanted corn, England would find France her competitor in every market where she might have otherwise hoped for supply.

"But I will rest my opinion of him as a statesman on his conduct in the late negotiation; I mean after the 4th of September, after his paltry intrigue to overturn the French government had failed. He knew that Austria would make a separate peace, if this country determined to continue the war; he knew that, in consequence of that peace, France would esta-

blish her ascendancy in Italy, and the Mediterranean sea; and let it be remembered, Sir, that this expression, the Mediterranean sea, is of an import very different now, from what it was antecedently to the peace between France and Austria. All the eastern part of the Mediterranean sea is now open to France; and the Grand Seignior is as much dependent on France for protection, as the Nabob of Oude is on the English government. He knew that from the moment peace was concluded between France and Austria, Portugal and Germany, as well as Spain and Holland, would stand in awe of the power of France. He knew the situation of Ireland; he knew that he had exhausted the funding system; that he had been obliged to have recourse to that perilous measure, paper-money; that he could no longer lay taxes on consumption, and that he must have recourse to this new mode of a requisition on income: yet, knowing all this, he wanted the political wisdom to see, that this country ought to make peace in conjunction with Austria. That if this country was the last to relinquish the war, it would make peace

on the most disadvantageous terms; and he determined to expose this country to all the hazards consequent on the continuance of the war, in hopes of retaining Trinidad, the Cape of Good Hope, and Trincomale.

" Sir, it has been said by an honourable Alderman, on a former night, that though the bill is odious, yet those he converses with fear nothing so much as the removal of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is very possible that this is true. Those who profit by the wasteful expenditure of public money, can never find a minister more suited to their wishes. But can any man say, that he confides in the Chancellor of the Exchequer from the review of his conduct? Sir, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer was first advanced to power, it is not surprising that he was viewed with partiality: we remembered his father's virtues, his talents, his services: we easily believe what we wish, and we were willing to believe that the country would derive much benefit from the son's administration. We had observed that, in the father, the talents of the statesman had been accompanied by

the powers of eloquence: we admired the fluency with which the son addressed this House; and from his resemblance to his father in this faculty, we presumed that he resembled him in all the qualities of a statesman. Sir, casual observers did not remark the difference between the father's eloquence and the son's. In the father's political wisdom was the ground-work, eloquence the result; he spoke forcibly, because he had reflected deeply. In the son, the knack of talking is the ground-work; and he never has acquired political wisdom.

"The Chancellor of the Exchequer affords a striking proof of the soundness of an opinion delivered by one who joined the qualities of the statesman to those of the orator. '*Ac me quidem diû cogitantem, ratio ipsa in hanc potissimum sententiam ducit; ut existimem, sapientiam sine eloquentiâ parum prodesse civitatibus; eloquentiam verò sine sapientiâ, nimium obesse plerumque, prodesse nunquam. Quare si quis, omissis studiis rationis et officii, consumit omnem operam in exercitatione dicendi, is inutilis sibi, patriæ perniciosus civis alitur.*' And

I am fully convinced, upon mature reflection, that political wisdom without eloquence is not often useful in a free state. But that eloquence without political wisdom is most frequently injurious, never beneficial. If any man, therefore, neglecting the pursuit of political wisdom, applies his whole attention to acquire the knack of talking, he becomes useless to himself, pernicious to his country.

"Sir, we have instances that whole nations have been mistaken in the expectations they had formed of a statesman. It is but a few years ago that M. Necker was considered as the tutelary angel of France; there is now but one opinion of him, viz. that he was a weak man, in whose character vanity was the leading feature. I do not mean to impute vanity to the Right Honourable Gentleman. Were I to mark the resemblance between him and M. Necker, in the place of vanity, I should substitute arrogance; perhaps the only natural quality which remains in that work of art, the present Chancellor of the Exchequer."

Note 7.—Page 84.

The Cinque Ports appear to have been bound by tenure to furnish ships to the King. The Cornish Ports do not appear to have been bound to such a service. It may be inferred from this circumstance, that the Cornish harbours had no ships of any great importance.

Note 8.—Page 85.

Although Charles VII. was allowed to impose taxes by his edict, without the concurrence of the Etats Generaux, yet the claim met with considerable resistance. The two kingdoms of France and England were at that time under governments very nearly similar. We find in the remarks of Monsieur Joly upon the works of Loysel, page 490., that the following remonstrance was made to Charles VII. in open court, by John Juvenel, Archbishop of Rheims. This remonstrance, which is preserved in the King's library, proves the necessity of the consent of the nation to the establishment of imposts, then known by the name

of Octrois. "I have been informed," says the Archbishop, "that there is in your Privy Council a person, who said in your presence, upon the subject of levying money upon the people [who were represented as extremely poor], *that the people are always grumbling and complaining*, which was a thing very improper to be said in your presence; for it is rather an expression to be uttered to an inhuman tyrant who has neither pity nor compassion upon his people, than before you, who are a most Christian King. Whatever some may say of your kingly power, *you* cannot take what is *mine;* what is *mine* is not *yours*. In matters of justice *you* are sovereign, and the jurisdiction is yours. You have your crown lands, and each individual has his."

Note 9.—Page 88.

The feudal burthens, which were retained in France, were accompanied with no small share of that judicial power which had formerly been exercised by the feudal lords. This jurisdiction was administered by the

Bailli appointed by the Seigneur, and was a source of great oppression.

Note 10.—Page 101.

It is manifest that Madame de Staël's book was written to elevate the character of her father as a financier, and as a statesman. She tells us, that, for five years together he raised loans without imposing any additional taxes; and that he intended to pay the interest on these loans by economical retrenchments. She says, his motive for raising these loans without imposing any new taxes, was to protect the King from being unpopular. The obvious meaning of this expression is, that he adopted this course to preserve *himself* from becoming unpopular. He intended, she says, to provide the interest by economical retrenchments; but she tells us, that the King's bounties were so great, that they exceeded the wasteful expences of Louis XV. We must collect from this, that there were no retrenchments; and thus, for five years together, M. Necker raised loans without

making any provision of taxes for the payment of the interest. This conduct, as Lord North wisely foretold, ruined the public credit of France, and accelerated the Revolution.

There is another circumstance in M. Necker's conduct, mentioned by Madame de Stael, which was so gross a violation of the good faith due from him to M. de Maurepas, that I cannot refrain from noticing it. M. de Maurepas had placed M. Necker in the situation of Comptroller of the Finances. M. de Maurepas was in the practice of accompanying every minister while he transacted business with the King. A fit of the gout disabled M. de Maurepas from giving his usual attendance. M. Necker availed himself of the minister's absence, to prevail upon the King to remove M. de Sartines from the employment of Marine Minister, and confer it on M. de Castries. Undoubtedly such conduct was a violation of that implied faith, which every subordinate member of a cabinet owes to the Prime Minister.

Madame de Stael tells us, that M. de Maurepas was offended at this; and that they knew that he employed his agents to censure the conduct of M. Necker. I have no doubt but that Madame Necker was a woman of talent; but she seems, on this occasion, to have had that desire of intermeddling in political matters, which was so much the usage of French ladies; for Madame de Stael tells us, that without the privity of her husband, she wrote a letter to M. de Maurepas, reproaching him with this conduct. Her interference was injudicious; for when M. Necker's enemies saw that he felt their calumnies, it was obvious that they would redouble them. Piqued at this, and imagining that the King would prefer to keep him in his service, rather than M. de Maurepas, M. Necker demanded from the King either his own dismission, or protection from the abuse of the agents of M. de Maurepas. The King accepted his offer of resignation, and dismissed him from his service. Thus did M. Necker fall the victim of his own vanity and ingratitude. Perhaps it would be difficult to find three

persons who appear to have been more actuated by vanity, than M. Necker, his wife, and Madame de Stael.

NOTE 11.—Page 102.

M. Necker was guilty of a great mistake in not ascertaining, before the meeting of the Etats Generaux, in what manner the different orders should deliberate, and vote. It was admitted that the King had a right to make regulations on this subject. Madame de Stael tells us, that M. Necker thought that the assembly, on its meeting, would itself immediately arrange this point: the smallest reflection must have shown him, that if this matter were left to their decision, the Etats Generaux must commence their proceedings with the most violent discussions.

NOTE 12.—Page 103.

I have spoken very shortly of the reign of terror, but it seems to me to have been the result of those principal causes which occasioned the French Revolution: and of

circumstances which arose in the progress of that Revolution. The distinction of Noblesse and Bourgeoisie was the leading and the principal cause from which that great event had flowed; this distinction had divided the nation into two classes; it had degraded those who were not noble, and the people were become too opulent and intelligent to submit any longer to the humiliating distinction. The same distinction may be considered as having existed in Sparta, between the citizens of Sparta and the Helots. But the Spartans were in truth a permanent standing army, and they kept the Helots poor, ignorant, and unarmed; by this policy they were able to retain the Helots in subjection. While the French Nobles were the only soldiers, and the rest of the nation ignorant, poor, and unpractised in that military service which at that time was alone considered of importance; I mean the service on horseback; the Nobles were able to keep down the lower class. But the use of gunpowder changed the military art; instead of cavalry, armies consisted principally of infantry. Wealth and superior bodily strength were

no longer necessary for the composition of a soldier; and when the Bourgeois became soldiers, and were serving in the same ranks with the Nobles, the degrading distinction of Noble and Bourgeois became more humiliating. The sale of nobility was another circumstance which increased the disgust; these *anoblis* had no circumstance to recommend them, except the rank which they had thus purchased; they had neither ancestry, nor military achievements, which they could be proud of; they rested their pretensions to superiority on the rank of Noblesse which they had acquired; and became more eager to assert their privileges, in proportion as the people became less disposed to bear them. These and other circumstances had rendered the distinction of Noblesse and Bourgeoissie odious to the great mass of the French people; and the Revolution was adopted by the nation as the means of rescuing them from this humiliating degradation. Marie Antoinette had been educated in the love of arbitrary power; the Royalists encouraged her in this sentiment; and the queen influenced the king to practise duplicity and falsehood

so repeatedly, that the people had no longer any confidence in the royal family. No man who had adopted the wish of reforming abuses could serve the king. It is possible that M. de La Fayette thought a republican government more likely to promote the happiness of the people than a monarchy; yet all his conduct shows, that, if the court had acted with sincerity, he would have assisted them in establishing a limited monarchy, but the queen and the court broke faith so repeatedly, that they at last lost the confidence of the whole nation. Every man saw that whatever the professions of the court might be, they never would relinquish the wish of re-establishing the hateful abuses, or, as the courtiers called it, the Ancien Regime. This opinion gradually drove the people mad. They preferred every ill to the return of their old grievances, and they submitted, in the progress of this sentiment, to the establishment of the reign of terror.

Louis XVIII. resumed royalty in 1814. It was most unfortunate for the tranquillity of France, that he returned to Paris ac-

companied by the emigrants. Their conduct sufficiently announced to the people, that the object of the court was the re-establishment of the Ancien Regime.

Buonaparte returned, and was received every where by the people with acclamations of joy. If Buonaparte had, by his conduct on his return, convinced the nation that he had relinquished the wish of being a military despot, and that from thenceforward he would be content with being a limited monarch, most probably he would not have been a second time driven out of France. The army supported him; but the nation withdrew its confidence. When he joined his army in June 1815, he knew that he left behind him enemies in Paris; that his army was the only support he could rely on; that the nation would not rise to assist him. It is probable that this sentiment induced him to risk every thing on the battle of Waterloo. Had he believed that the French nation would rise in his cause, with the same zeal as they had shown in their resistance to foreign armies at the

commencement of the Revolution, it is probable that he would not have hazarded his fortune on a single battle. With the army which he possessed, it was in his power to have drawn the war into length. There were many fortresses between the allied army and Paris, and the allies could never have ventured to march to Paris, and leave those fortresses behind them, while Buonaparte's army was entire. Even after the battle of Waterloo, the march to Paris was a very perilous measure; and it is generally believed that the Duke of Wellington would never have ventured on it, if he had not been encouraged to the adoption of that measure by the advice of those who remained in power at Paris. If the operations of the campaign had been protracted, and the voice of the people had been with him, enthusiasm would have hourly augmented the army of Buonaparte, and they would never have suffered Paris to be a second time taken by an enemy. But Buonaparte knew that the great body of the nation had withdrawn its confidence; that he had nothing to rely on but his army;

and after the battle of Waterloo, he seems to have abandoned his confidence in that army without necessity.

The Bourbons were led back to Paris. They had a second time an opportunity of establishing their dynasty in a limited monarchy; but the influence of the emigrants again deluded them. They still remain in France; but it is manifest to the most casual observer, that either the Ancien Regime must be restored, or the present dynasty removed. It was observed to me by a French gentleman, "Sir, you cannot suppose that we are so blind as not to perceive that the executive government is hostile to the constitution. The law of elections, the law for recruiting the army, the establishment of lettres de cachét, and the censure on the press, sufficiently indicate the wishes of our Government. If further proof be wanting, look at the conduct of the missionaries, at the establishment of convents, and the maintenance of a corps of secréts, in this very city in which we are now conversing. I might add, that

all employments are conferred on those who are unfriendly to the constitution."

I cannot refrain from remarking in this place, how unfortunate it was that those great families whom Mr. Edmund Burke deluded into the desire of a crusade against French principles, had not an accurate knowledge of the causes which led to the French Revolution. Had they seen that it was the division of France into two distinct classes of Nobles and Bourgeois which had given occasion to the Revolution, they must have known that there was no such division of the people of England; and that consequently we had no real cause to apprehend a similar revolution: their ignorance was the source of our misfortunes. Mr. Pitt was equally ignorant of the causes of the French Revolution. He embarked in the war as the measure which would be the least embarrassing to his administration. His colleagues in the cabinet had one object: he himself, as far as he can be said to have had any definite object, was actuated by an object incompatible with that of his

colleagues; he found himself entangled, and that he could not retreat from that war in which he had engaged; he floundered on without wisdom, and without weighing the consequences of the measures which he brought forward. He imposed taxes without considering how destructive they were to the happiness of the people; he negotiated with foreign states, without remarking how unequal they were to the measures which he wished them to effectuate. He relinquished his former sentiments of frugality, because he found that wasteful expenditure was necessary to enable him to carry on his government.

In February 1797, he brought forward the measure of paper money. Most probably he at that time thought it necessary for the safety of the bank; for I cannot suppose that he intended that the Bank of England should double their property by that measure. The proposal was very little discussed in the House of Commons, I believe only on one day; for, although the integrity and good sense of Mr. Fox led him to abstain from supporting the crusade,

yet the facility and kindness of his temper made him reluctant in resisting a measure which his friends, at that time the colleagues of Mr. Pitt, had concurred in.

NOTE 13.—Page 103.

The alarm of a deficiency of corn in France in 1789, had a very important influence in accelerating the Revolution; but this alarm was chiefly occasioned by the injudicious edicts of M. Necker; by those edicts he suggested a deficiency; and this suggestion created the alarm.

The same thing happened in England in 1795, from the indiscreet letter of the Duke of Portland to the mayor of Nottingham. By this letter he suggested a deficiency; and the suggestion created an alarm, and the alarm created the distress. In 1799, Mr. Pitt committed the same error; his suggestions, and his attempts to give relief, increased the distress. The proposal that the rich should abstain from eating bread, in order that a greater abundance of bread might be left for the poor, was an

act of such gross folly, that we can hardly conceive how any man could have proposed it; all the measures at that time adopted by the ministers augmented the distress, by increasing the alarm. In England perhaps the crops of corn never exceed, or fall short, to the extent generally imagined. In the most abundant years, I believe the wheat exported has never exceeded ten per cent. upon the consumption; and the importation, (except on the occasion of the alarm created in 1799,) has never been of a greater quantity. The stoppage of the distillery would at all times relieve the people from any distress for food. Perhaps the distress for corn in France in 1789, was chiefly, if not entirely, owing to the injudicious edicts and memoirs of M. Necker. —See Young's Travels in France.

Memorandum.—The French fleet was directed to hazard a battle with the English fleet under Lord Howe, on the 1st June 1794, for the sole object of securing the entrance of the American convoy with corn into the ports of France. Yet the corn on board that fleet was not sufficient to main-

tain the people of France for one entire day; but the introduction was important, because it contributed to diminish the alarm.

There is much less reason to fear a want of bread corn in England, than there is to entertain the same apprehension in France. In England a large proportion of our harvest is consumed in the distillery and in the brewery. By stopping the consumption of corn in those articles, we can at all times relieve the wants of the people. The French do not possess these means of relief. So very small a proportion of their corn is consumed either in the distillery, or in the brewery, that, in case of a failure of their crops, they can look only to importation; and, in a country of such extent as France, importation must afford inadequate relief. I believe this circumstance has been several times felt in France. The failure of the crop in 1788, had excited such apprehensions, that their fears had not vanished in 1794. It has been said that similar fears, and the necessity of introducing corn into France by importation, accelerated the

completion of the treaty of Aix la Chapelle in 1748. The failure of the rice crop in Bengal, almost always produces a famine; for no other country has a sufficient abundance to afford a supply of food to the inhabitants. France is in a situation somewhat similar; but the improvement of her agriculture promises relief.

Note 14. — Page 199.

Philippe Le Bel, who was King of France during the reign of Edward I., is stated by the French historians to have been the first monarch of France who had ever summoned the Tiers Etat to the assembly of the Etats Generaux. He did this in 1303; and it is admitted by all the French writers, that he adopted this practice to give himself an additional force against his great vassals. In this he probably only imitated the policy of his contemporary Edward I.

Note 15. — Page 200.

Since the publication of the above reflection, two measures have been brought

forward in parliament, and supported by the influence of the Earl of Liverpool. From the support which these measures have received, I am led to hope that a reform in the House of Commons, consonant to the principles above suggested, is likely soon to be adopted. The measures to which I allude, are the disfranchisement of the borough of Grampound, and the order of the House of Commons, that a list of the names of those members who hold places or pensions should be laid on their table. In calculating the importance of the disfranchisement of the borough of Grampound, I take into consideration the language with which the Earl of Liverpool accompanied the measure. He said, "that it was not a judicial measure, not a Bill of Pains and Penalties, but a Bill of Regulation; that experience had shown them that the borough of Grampound was so diseased, that it was no longer qualified to exercise the function of electing members to serve in parliament. On this ground he thought the franchise of electing members should be taken from Grampound, and transferred to another body of the commonalty." I

think this language perfectly constitutional. Magistracy is not property, but trust. Powers, conferred for the benefit of the people, may be taken from those who are inadequate to their exercise, and transferred to those who are more competent to the discharge of the duty. Various instances occur in our history of boroughs which have been deprived of their franchise. It has been supposed, that those boroughs surrendered their franchise; but the acceptance of a surrender amounted to a deprivation. I believe that there are examples even of individual Peers who have been deprived of their right to sit in Parliament, although they had not committed any act of forfeiture. How can we justify the Exclusion Bill brought into Parliament in the reign of Charles II., or the change of dynasty in 1688, except on this principle, that magistracy may be lawfully taken from those who are found unfit to exercise it, and transferred to those in whom the people have more confidence. I hope and trust, that the principles advanced on the disfranchisement of Grampound, will influence the opinion of Parliament when

they take into consideration the state of other boroughs. If Grampound was incapable of exercising its functions, because it was diseased, *à fortiori*, must a borough which is actually dead be incapable of such exercise; and is not this the case in a burgage tenement borough in which all the burgages belong to a Peer? The peer himself is not capable of voting, because he is not of the order of the commonalty; and the fictitious colourable conveyances which he has executed the night before the election, have conveyed no property to the several grantees. I have mentioned burgage tenement boroughs, but I certainly consider those boroughs which have given themselves up to patrons, who feed them either with their own money, or with places procured from the minister, as equally fit to be disfranchised.

Let us view the situation of the borough of Grampound. I will go no further back than the general election of 1780. At that time Grampound, with two other boroughs in the county of Cornwall, was under the influence of one patron; he was an oppo-

nent of the administration, and, as he wished to keep well with both parts of the opposition, he gave the nomination for two seats to the Marquis of Rockingham, and for two others to the Earl of Shelburne. The other two seats were kept by the patron for himself and a private friend. The price paid by the nominees for each seat was 3000*l*. I am unacquainted with the circumstances which took place at the elections which intervened between 1780 and 1796. But in that year the electors of Grampound discovered, that, although their patron only distributed 3000*l*. among the electors, he was in the practice of receiving 6000*l*. at every general election from the two members returned. They therefore determined to sell through another patron, from whom they might receive the full sum paid by the two elected members.

The return of members to parliament ought not to be obtained by bribery; but is it more injurious to the state when the electors appropriate the whole money to themselves, than it is when they are cheated out of one-half of it by their patron. The

elector receives the bribe, at the peril of being convicted in a penalty of 500*l.* but at the period I allude to, the patron, not being an elector, was subject to no penalty. But the mischief to the state is much greater when an individual peer has acquired the nomination to *many* seats. Is it not known that there are at this time two noble Earls, one of whom names nine members, and the other eight? What political power might not be acquired by the confederacy of a few such individuals? We are compelled to acquiesce in the waste of the public money by the minister, to enable him to resist the efforts of such confederacies.

Let any man read the Memoirs of the late Earl Waldegrave, and see the power which the Duke of Newcastle had acquired, in consequence of the existing state of boroughs. For ten weeks, in the year 1757, he kept George II. without ministers; and when the King had, at last, prevailed on the Earl Waldegrave to consent to be minister, the Duke of Newcastle put his negative on the appointment, by signifying that the Earl Waldegrave should not be

supported by the Duke's friends in Parliament. Will any man say, that this is a situation in which a King ought to be placed? Kings may sometimes require to be controuled by their ministers; but I will own, that I am indignant when I see a British Sovereign kicked and trampled on by such a despicable wretch as Holles, Duke of Newcastle.

The other measure, supported by the influence of the Earl of Liverpool, was the order that a list of those members of the House of Commons who hold places or pensions, should be laid on the table. I consider this vote as the first step towards purifying the House of Commons; it must be productive of beneficial consequences; either it must be followed up by a bill, limiting the number of pensioners and placemen in the House of Commons; or the minister will be afraid to impose heavy taxes, when it is known that they are voted by men who are in his pay. I am aware that there are other means, besides places and pensions, by which members of the House of Commons may be corrupted. We

know from history the means by which the ministers of Charles II. managed the long Parliament of that reign. I believe it is equally well known, that similar methods were employed by Lord North during the American war. Immoderate taxation now oppresses every rank of society, and every individual who does not receive emoluments from the public. The people must be relieved ;— an adequate retrenchment of the expenditure cannot take place without a Reform of Parliament.

NOTE 16. — Page 218.

We frequently hear the complaints of the partisans of the great Whig families, that, notwithstanding all their endeavours to serve the country, the people give them a cold and reluctant support. I believe that this opinion is well founded. Sir Robert Walpole conducted public affairs by uniting the influence of the Crown to the Whig party. His successors, the Pelhams, adopted another plan. They supported themselves by confederacy ; and although the Duke of Newcastle had no qualities which could command respect, he possessed those dispositions which induced men to enter into

his party; and it has been truly remarked of him, that he had collected the most powerful faction ever known in this country. The confederates were to acquire the nomination to seats in Parliament, either as patrons or proprietors. They were assisted by the influence of the Crown, and rewarded with office and emolument. This party sometimes resisted the momentary wishes of George II.; but in general they gratified him in his German views, and in his predominent passion, the accumulation of private wealth. Until their coalition with Mr. Pitt, in 1757, they brought forward no plan which deserved the esteem or admiration of the country. Their measures were the little efforts of little minds.

While Frederick Prince of Wales was the leader of the Opposition, aversion to the Pelham party, and a resolution to break it if ever the Prince and his friends succeeded to power, seems to have been adopted as a fundamental principle at Leicester House. From the death of Frederick, Prince of Wales, his son, afterwards George III., was impressed with this senti-

ment; and on his succeeding to the throne, he bent his views to the completion of this object. Although the Pelham party was never popular, yet it was very powerful. It had possessed for many years, without interruption, the distribution of every emolument which the Crown could bestow; and it was to be expected, that they would resist the design of removing them from power. The first minister whom George III. employed for this purpose, was the Earl of Bute; he was wholly unequal to the undertaking. He was succeeded by George Grenville; but as this gentleman was not sufficiently obedient to the wishes of the King, he was soon removed. The King was then prevailed on to bring the Pelham party again into power; and the Marquis of Rockingham was made Prime Minister. He continued in office about a year. On his removal, the King formed a new administration by the advice, and at the nomination of the Earl of Chatham. The Duke of Grafton, a feeble and inefficient man, was made prime minister; but it was announced, that the administration was to move under the direction of the Earl of Chatham. The

Earl of Chatham fell ill; his illness made it necessary for him to withdraw from the Cabinet. The King became his own minister, and gradually directed the measures of his ostensible ministers, against the liberties of his American subjects. It may be naturally asked, what could have inspired George III. with this wish to extinguish the privileges of the American colonies? It has been attributed to the influence of those impressions which he had received in early life from the Earl of Bute. I can easily believe that the Earl of Bute impressed on him the love of arbitrary power; but I must acknowledge, that I do not think this cause was adequate to the effect; I rather believe that it was owing to the King's having been impressed, in early life, with that aversion to the principles of liberty, and those sentiments of personal domination, which are found prevalent in every petty German Court. The American Colonies had been originally settled by men actuated by the love of civil and religious liberty; and in many of them the Government savoured very strongly of Republicanism. Whether the King had imbibed his love of

arbitrary power from his mother, or from the Earl of Bute, or from both, he saw with aversion this republican spirit. He determined to crush it; and as obstinacy was the leading feature in his character, he never relinquished this wish, until he had deprived himself of the allegiance of his American subjects.

The remnant of the Pelham party, which had been collected under the Marquis of Rockingham, as their head, and had been in possession of office for about a year, from the summer 1765, to the summer 1766, had acted with great wisdom and integrity during the short period of their power. They restored to the Americans their violated rights. Most probably, it was for this conduct that they were deprived of office. When the American war broke out, they took their station in opposition; they acted manfully and honourably; but they were not popular. The Pelham party had been originally formed on the principle of confederacy; this is an odious principle, not calculated to conciliate esteem; it savours of faction; it is not built

upon the great basis of public interest; and although the Marquis of Rockingham, the new leader of the party, was both amiable and estimable, yet, even while he lived, the party can scarcely be said to have been popular.

The influence which Mr. Edmund Burke had acquired over the Marquis of Rockingham, was great; but that which he afterwards possessed over the mind of the Duke Portland, was still more considerable. In fact, the Duke of Portland had no opinions of his own; he spoke and acted under the direction of Mr. Burke. The India Bill brought forward in November 1783, and the contest which followed, left the party not only deprived of office, but also highly unpopular. The peace had enabled the country to recover much of its prosperity; and perhaps Mr. Pitt drew more credit from this circumstance than he merited. The King's illness in 1788, and the conduct of the opposition on that occasion, while it conciliated compassion to the King, revived the unpopularity of the Whig families. The French Revolution burst forth in 1789. Perhaps at

the very commencement, it excited alarm in the nobles, as well as in the King. They were misled by the similitude of names; but Mr. Pitt wisely restrained this country from interfering in the affairs of France. Towards the close of the year 1792, Mr. Burke had sufficient influence over the great Whig families, to induce them to concur with the King in clamouring for a crusade against French principles. Mr. Pitt was unable to resist; and that he might retain his situation as Minister, he was under the necessity of receiving the great Whig families into his Cabinet, and of embarking the country in the crusade. To say that this crusade has failed, would not adequately express the consequences which have followed from it. It has established the principles of liberty through the greatest part of Europe, and of South America; while Great Britain exhibits itself to every eye, exhausted by those efforts which it has been prevailed on to employ. Nor is the contest at an end; Europe must suffer more paroxysms, before it is depurated from the remains of feudalism. In this crisis, the great Whig families [illegible] themselves to the people;

they offer themselves as the assertors of its rights; but they are not trusted. The people complain loudly of their sufferings, but have little reliance on the great Whig families for their relief.

NOTE 17. — Page 222.

Many of the powers of the Pope were not claimed till after the commencement of the crusades; and perhaps it might be shown, that several of those powers were assumed by the Pope, in imitation of powers exercised by the Caliphs, as successors of Mahomet.

NOTE 18. — Page 242.

The original Saxon words in our language are, for the most part, of few syllables. Those words which consist of many syllables are, in general, derived from the Latin through the French.

NOTE 19. — Page 244.

Lord North had agreed to support the accusation brought forward in the House

of Commons against Lord Clive. I happened to be with Mr. Thurlow the morning after the debate. General Burgoyne came in: he observed, that although Lord North had professed to speak against Lord Clive, yet it was so manifest from Lord North's speech, that he wished his friends should vote for him; that during the debate Lord George Germaine got up, kissed his hand to General Burgoyne, and walked out of the House. General Burgoyne had been one of the most active accusers; and Thurlow had supported the accusation with sincerity. I recollect Thurlow's remark in answer to General Burgoyne. "Lord North has played a very deep, and a very dirty game: he drove Lord Clive to the wall, forced him to surrender his six members, and then abandoned the accusers." But although the accusation failed, it broke Lord Clive's heart: he fell a victim to the mortification which he had suffered. Lord Clive had not been accustomed to public speaking, yet he defended himself in the debate with great ability, and much dignity. He closed his defence with these words: "He hoped that when the House decided on his ho-

nour, they would not forget their own." The mind of Lord Clive was certainly cast in the heroic mould; and if our Indian empire is of any value to Great Britain, Lord Clive undoubtedly laid the foundation of that empire. As an Englishman I am grateful to his memory.

" His saltem accumulem donis, et fungar inani
" Munere."

Note 20. — Page 246.

I was informed by the late Warren Hastings, that while he was Governor General of Bengal, he sent as a present to the Directors of the East India Company one hundred and seventy-two Dareics. They had been found buried in an earthen pot, on the bank of a river in the province of Benares. The Dareic is a gold coin of the antient Persian empire, deriving its name from the Persian Emperor Darius, and having on its reverse an archer. In allusion to this reverse, Agesilaus, King of Sparta, said, " He had been driven out of Asia by 30,000 archers, by which expression he meant, that he had been forced to relin-

quish his expedition, by the efforts of those orators in the different republics of Greece, who had been bribed with Persian money. Perhaps the Dareic is the most rare gold coin that is come down to us from ancient times. There is one in the British Museum, and I believe there is another in the collection of coins belonging to the King of France. I never heard but of one more, and I forget in whose collection it exists. Mr. Hastings told me, that when he sent these coins to the Court of Directors, he considered himself as making the most magnificent present to his masters that he might ever have it in his power to send them. Judge of his surprise when he found, on his arrival in England, that these Dareics had been sent to the melting pot. I do not know the names of the Directors of that year; they were fortunate in not having been tried for this act by a jury of antiquarians.

A very learned Jew, now living in London, assures me, that he once conversed with two young men who by some accident had been brought in one of the East

India Company's ships to England from Cochin-China. They conversed with him in the Hebrew language, and were well acquainted with the rites of the Jewish religion. On enquiring from him what became of those men, he told me that the Directors had sent them back to China. I cannot but regret that they were so hastily and so indiscreetly sent back, There is good reason to believe, that there is a considerable number of Jews in the Chinese empire; that Jews have existed in China from a very distant period, long before that intercourse which has been established during the last 300 years between Europe and China; that they have retained their language and their religious rites. The information which could have been obtained from these Jews, might have furnished a clue to a more exact knowledge of the state of Judæism in Asia. Of the twelve tribes carried up by Nebuchadnezzar, only two and a half returned with Cyrus. It is probable that the other nine tribes and a half have been dispersed through every part of Asia.

NOTE 21. — Page 250.

I recollect the expression which a French gentleman once used to me as descriptive of the British empire. He said it was *une araignée à petit corps et grandes jambes.* And when I reflect on the number of appendages which have been annexed to Great Britain, I cannot help thinking that there is much truth in this observation. No acquisition, be it ever so insignificant, seems to have escaped the wishes of our ministers; even the petty island of Heligoland has been thought deserving of their notice. The reason is obvious, every acquisition affords a pretence for patronage; and patronage, taxation, and a dread of the progress of the principles of liberty, are the only subjects which our ministers think of.

But of all our acquisitions, the empire which has been formed in India, seems to be that which is likely to be productive of the most important consequences. Has the British empire in India, down to the present time, produced any benefit to us? This is a question which cannot be answered without much reflection. I am not prepared to

say, that our acquisitions in India may not have produced benefit; but I hesitate much to say, that they have upon the whole been advantageous to us. The wealth which has been brought into this country from India, has enabled our Government to make greater exertions in all its transactions with foreign states. When George III. invaded the rights of his American subjects, the wealth of India enabled him to support a war against France, Spain, and Holland, without relinquishing his expensive efforts against the inhabitants of America. The crusade against French principles, begun in 1793, may also be considered as having owed its long continuance to the wealth of India. That wealth enabled the British government to subsidize every sovereign who was willing to receive its money; but what has been the effect of these exertions? You see it in the luxurious few, and in the impoverished many. It is true, that the wealth of India may have enabled us to improve our agriculture, and our manufactures, and to extend our commerce; but it has led our Government to those wasteful exertions which have more than balanced

these advantages. Patronage, immoderate taxation, and the minister's power of corruption, have kept pace with the growth of our Indian empire. I have heard physicians say, that the juices of the human frame become sometimes so vitiated, that death is desirable. Perhaps we may be fast approaching to the hour, when Revolution, the euthanasia of Governments, may be looked for as a relief.

But the calamities which I foresee are from the loss of India. Sooner or later the Indian empire must be torn from us; and our exertions to prevent that loss will most probably leave us with every resource exhausted.

It is scarcely possible that our Indian empire can, for any great length of time, be united to Great Britain. Our government in that country is repugnant to the happiness of the inhabitants, it is avowed to be for the benefit of the governors, not of the governed; it is a government by foreigners, that, as fast as they acquire wealth, carry it [illegible] country. No relations of amity

grow up between the governors, and the governed. Religious usages obstruct intercourse between the Hindoos, and the Europeans. And the Mahometans, who, before our acquisition of empire in that country, possessed all offices, both civil and military; cannot but look on us with aversion; their degradation is far greater than that of the Hindoos: their nobles seek subsistence as privates among our troops; they are not trusted with power, and they are deprived of their wealth; even the intercourse between the sexes has no tendency to soften the hatred of the Mahometans to the Europeans. The progeny are left a degraded race, helpless, and wretched; despised by the Europeans, and hated by the Mahometans. Whenever an addition is made to our empire, the opulence of the inhabitants is rapidly diminished. When the victory of Plassy laid the foundation of our greatness in India, there were many Hindoos of prodigious wealth, and Mahometans of great power; both classes have disappeared; even the Europeans who every year go out, complain that they shall return with fortunes no ways proportionate to

those of the individuals who had preceded them. The first countries which we acquired had the most productive soils; nearly the whole of Bengal is alluvial ground: under a hot sun, and with a command of water, its productions are to an extent unknown in a northern climate: and as the inhabitants consume but little, much is left for the European conqueror. But in proportion as our empire has been extended, the soil has been found less fertile, and the inhabitants less opulent. After the first acquirers had carried off the fruits of their conquest, the Europeans who succeeded them, found little more than the gleanings of the harvest; yet the whole extent of country productive, and unproductive, requires equally to be defended. I am aware that, as long as the government of India can find money to pay their Sepoys, there is good reason to believe that these soldiers will be faithful; but perhaps the moment may arrive, when this money is not to be found.

Whether the inhabitants under our do- [illegible] amount to sixty millions,

or eighty millions, I will not pretend to say; but it is pretty well ascertained, that the revenue drwan from them does not exceed seventeen millions. I believe the India Company derives no profit from its commerce with Indostan: this commerce will probably be abandoned; for it affords the means of oppressing the English competitor, without being profitable to the Company: its commerce with China is perfectly distinct.

I have said that we cannot reckon upon retaining our empire in Indostan for any great length of time; but I will not pretend to guess at the manner in which we are to lose it. Viewing the present power of Russia, and the ambition which seems to animate its government, some have thought, that we are in danger of an invasion from that quarter; but I have said in my Recollections, that I do not feel those apprehensions. I am aware that the Russians have the entire command of the Caspian. They may therefore land an army with all its appendages at the southern extremity of that sea. I will suppose that

the rumour of their having obtained a complete ascendant in the court of the King of Persia, is well founded; they may therefore receive every assistance in marching their army through Persia; but there are two other nations through whose territories they must pass, before they can reach the British possessions in India; the first of these consists of those provinces which Kouli Khan tore from the empire of the Great Mogul: I know not by what name they are at this time usually described; they were formerly called the dominions of Zemaun Shah; sometimes they have been called the kingdom of Caubul; by others they have been denominated the country of the Affghaus, or Affghistan; but by whatever name they are to be known, they form a powerful nation: and it would be difficult for a Russian army to pass through the country, against the wishes of its government. If they succeed in passing through the country of the Affghaus, there still remain the Seiks, a warlike and powerful people; capable of affording much opposition to the march of a Russian army.

I have heard it computed by some, that the passage of a Russian army from the southern shore of the Caspian to Delhi, could not be performed in less than eighteen months. I have heard others assign a much shorter time; but it will be recollected that no inconsiderable army of reserve will be required, to keep up a communication from the Caspian to the frontiers of the British empire. The ambitious views of the Russian government may lead them to meditate such an attempt; but should they put the design in execution, they would derive no advantage from it; they could collect no treasure to be sent back to Russia; and their army would be wasted, in proportion as it advanced. It may be said perhaps, that Kouli Khan acquired much wealth by the capture of Delhi: and I believe that this is true. Let it, however, be remembered, that Delhi was at that time the capital of the Mogul empire; from which circumstance the wealth of the whole peninsula had for centuries been gradually collecting in that place, and its vicinity: but the neighbourhood of Delhi is not now the richest part of our dominions. I be-

lieve on the contrary, that it is one of the poorest. I still, therefore, retain the opinion I have before advanced, that our great danger is not from Russia.

We have had formidable mutinies among our European officers: and if means cannot be found to enable them to return to Europe with a degree of affluence, after having spent a moderate portion of their lives in India, it is probable that such mutinies may again break out. I think that it was a wise regulation, to enable these officers to return to Europe with liberal pensions, after the service of a certain number of years. If the European officers could not return with comfort to themselves, they would be induced to remain in India: and they would then be dangerous to the Indian government. It is said, that the native soldiers are faithful and obedient, while punctually paid, but they must be treated with justice, and kindness, their religious prejudices must be respected, and their customs must not be violated. Under the present system of government, the country is every year becoming poorer. There is, therefore, a

danger that the moment may arrive, when we shall not be able to collect that revenue which is necessary for its defence. Occasional insurrections in different places must be expected; and perhaps some military adventurer may unexpectedly appear, who may collect an army that will meet us in the field.

There is a circumstance which seems never to have attracted the attention of our Indian government, I mean the present number of those who are born from the intercourse between the Europeans and the natives; these have no connexion with the families of their mothers, are abandoned by their fathers, and seem to be proscribed by the government. I believe that they are not allowed to serve in the Company's army; whether they are allowed to serve in civil employments I do not know. But I cannot help thinking, that there must be danger from a large portion of the inhabitants of a country thus isolated; without either private or political connexion. I may be told perhaps, that they are disunited, and in no degree conscious of their own

importance; this may be true; but an ambitious leader may bring them together, and make use of them.

Many people have a strong wish to convert the inhabitants of the British empire in India to Christianity. Whatever I may say on this point, I desire to be considered as viewing the subject solely in a political light. The division of the inhabitants into Mahometans, and Hindoos; and the more minute division of the latter into tribes and casts, certainly facilitated our acquisition of empire in Indostan. The religion of the Hindoo is so blended with his social habits, and even with his affections, that it is hardly possible for him voluntarily to quit the cast in which he was born. The man who has lost his cast, is separated from his parents, from his wife, and from his children; he must relinquish even those friends and companions with whom he has lived from his infancy. By thus blending and interweaving social usages with religious opinions, Brama has planted morality among his followers: and has obtained a longer duration for his doctrines, than has yet ex-

isted in any other religious establishment. We know that the religious opinions and usages of Brama were in full force on the invasion of India by Alexander the Great: and it was not then known, at what point of time those usages had been first established. We are told that Moses was versed in all the learning of the Egyptians; there is reason to believe that the Egyptians derived their opinions from the Bramins.* If this supposition is well founded, the religion of Brama must have existed before the age of Moses. The wisdom of Brama has procured durability for his institutions. Let our Missionaries use persuasion, but let them abstain from insult, and contempt.

But although I fear the consequences of our efforts to preserve ourselves from being deprived of our Indian empire, yet I wish that every advantage should be derived from it, while we continue to possess it.

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* There are found among the Egyptian hieroglyphics, figures of animals not existing in Egypt, but which do exist in India. The inference which some have been willing to draw from this circumstance is, that the hieroglyphical language of Egypt was derived from India.

The exclusive commerce of the India Company has hitherto prevented us from searching for those various productions which that country affords. This obstruction has now been removed, and when the remedy is completed, by the Company's relinquishing that trade, which it now carries on concurrently with the private merchant, we shall probably reap advantages as yet unthought of. Sugar can be raised in Bengal, and brought to England, at a cheaper rate than such produce can be brought from our West Indian Islands. I know it will be said, that the East India sugar is not equal in goodness to that from our Colonies; but let the duties be equalized, and sugars will soon be imported from India, as fit for the refiner, as those which are now brought to us from our Colonies. The variety of soil in which the article may be raised, the low price of labour, the command of water carriage to Calcutta, ensure success, when European intelligence is applied to this subject. We have been already able to procure Indigo from Bengal, equal in goodness to that from Guatimala; why may we not suppose, that European intelligence

and industry will have the same effects, when employed on the production of sugar. While the India Company possessed the exclusive trade, the bringing this article to Europe, was foreign to the plan of their commerce: their object was to bring valuable productions in a small number of ships: but the advantage to be derived from the sugar trade is, that a bulky produce requires a numerous shipping. Nor would this voyage to India be more destructive to the lives of sailors, than a voyage to the West Indies: for the ships would not be detained on their arrival at Calcutta, in the manner hitherto practised: and it is during their detention in the harbour of Calcutta, that the health of our sailors is destroyed by the cheap purchase of spirituous liquors. I am aware how much the bringing sugars from Bengal to Europe, would interfere with the interests of the West India planters: and the interests of these proprietors ought to be attended to. But while we continue to possess the Indian empire, we cannot refrain from wishing to procure every possible advantage from it. Let it also be re-

membered, that while we complain of want of employment for our shipping, no relief can be suggested for this distress more complete, than that of the importation of sugars from Bengal; it would at the same time, effectuate the wishes of those, who are anxious for the abolition of the slave trade.

The suggestion which I have thus ventured to advance, of supplying the European market with sugars from Indostan, would, in a great degree, prevent the opulence of that country from being diminished. It would also form a link of connexion between our Asiatic possessions and Great Britain; but the advantages which we may derive from our Indian empire, are not confined to our immediate dominions. Remove the restrictive power of the India Company, and commerce will speedily be carried on from the peninsula of India, to every country to the eastward; and as the Spanish possessions on the western side of America are now assuming the character of independent states, that whole portion of the globe which is situated between the penin-

sula of Indostan, and America, will present itself as a field of commerce to the British merchant.

NOTE 22. — Page 264.

The invasion of the Carnatic, in 1779, by Hyder Ali, was the consequence of an attempt made by the government of Madras, to put Mohammed Ali, the Nabob of Arcot, in possession of the Guntoor Circar. This territory had been possessed by Bazalet Jung, the brother of the Nizam. On the death of Bazalet Jung, the government of Madras claimed on the part of the English East India Company, a right to nominate a successor to the sovereignty. They conferred it on Mohammed Ali, the Nabob of Arcot. It was generally believed that Sir Thomas Rumbold, the governor of Madras, had received three lacks of pagodas, worth 120,000*l.* sterling, from the Nabob, for the grant of this Circar. And that three other members of the council of Madras, had each of them received a lack of pagodas. Sir Thomas Rumbold was afterwards accused by Mr. Dundas, in the House

of Commons, for this and other transactions, while governor of Madras. Whether Mr. Dundas followed up this accusation with sincerity, I cannot say; after having made some progress in it, he dropped it. But I can state with great certainty, that the principal leaders of the Opposition exerted themselves to protect Sir Thomas Rumbold. I can say this, because I was, myself, solicited to vote for Sir Thomas Rumbold. Hyder Ali had refused to the Madras government, permission for their troops to pass over a part of his territory, for the purpose of putting Mohammed Ali in possession of this province. In defiance of this refusal, they marched their troops through his dominions. The invasion of the Carnatic by Hyder Ali, was the fatal consequence of this measure. I have said, that each member of the council of Madras was supposed to have received 40,000*l.* for concurring in the cession of the Guntoor Circar to Mohammed Ali. Perhaps this opinion arose from an expression of one of the members of the council, when examined at the bar of the House of Lords; he said, that he had been offered 40,000*l.* for his

concurrence. The Earl of Shelburne somewhat archly asked him, if he was certain as to the exact sum of 40,000*l.*; to which he replied, "Yes, I am certain as to the exact sum; for they could not have offered me less." Upon which it was humorously remarked, "that you could not offer a member of the Madras council, a smaller bribe than 40,000*l.*" But the meaning of the witness was, that they could not have offered him, a sum inferior to that which they had given to his colleagues.

NOTE 23. — Page 304.

I have given my opinion on the abolition of the Slave Trade without reserve. I am fully persuaded, that those who urged on that measure, believed that they should promote the happiness of mankind. I wish I could say that they have succeeded. The desolation of the French part of the Island of St. Domingo, has been one of the unfortunate consequences of the suggestion. In the year 1790, when the French assemby enacted those laws which produced the insurrection of the slaves in St. Domingo,

they grounded their conduct on this argument; that the measure had been already successfully brought forward in the English Parliament. Mr. Wilberforce had never proposed the emancipation of the slaves already imported into the British Colonies. He was aware that the enfranchisement of the slaves in the islands could not be effected, without destroying the happiness of many thousands; and he wisely abstained from suggesting it. But the leaders of the French assembly were bolder. The property in St. Domingo belonged for the most part, to Royalists; and the leaders of that assembly were perhaps, less solicitous than Mr. Wilberforce about the sum of human happiness. Whoever travels through the western side of France, from Nantes to Bayonne, must every day meet with families whose fortunes have been ruined by the desolation of St. Domingo. What property has been destroyed, and what numbers of the French have perished in that calamitous affair, I cannot forget the 20,000,000*l.* sterling which have been uselessly expended by the English government, and the 20,000 British soldiers who,

are calculated to have perished in the attempt to restore tranquillity in that island. But St. Domingo remains a black colony; the formidable neighbour of the British island of Jamaica. We have expended large sums in bribing other governments to concur with us in abolishing the traffic; but the slave-trade is still continued; and as it is now carried on by contraband, the Negroes are conveyed in small ships far more crowded than they ever were before; and with much increase of misery to the slaves who are transported. The bounties which had been given to those masters of ships who transported the Negroes from Africa to the Islands with the smallest loss, had reduced the average to between one and two per cent. I cannot but regret that this line of policy was not persevered in. The advocates for the abolition of the slave-trade seem not to have recollected, that the western coast of Africa is not the only outlet for slaves; perhaps a larger proportion is sent out through Egypt; and the misery of those who travel this road is far greater than that of the Negroes who are transported from the western coast of Africa by sea.

The late Mr. Browne, who travelled from Darfur to Siout in Egypt, with a caravan, consisting of about 10,000 Negroes, told me, that the misery experienced by the slaves exceeded every thing that could be conceived. By way of proof, he mentioned that, of seven camels which he had bought at Darfur for the conveyance of his baggage, five had died from fatigue or want of water, in the passage through the desert. What must have been the misery of the Negro, when the camel, which seems an animal almost formed by nature for the desert, thus sunk under its sufferings.

Since the above reflection was committed to paper, I have seen an account of Mr. Wilberforce's speech in the House of Commons; on a motion made by him, respecting the present state of the slave-trade. I hope, that whoever reads this reflection, will give me credit for paying to Mr. Wilberforce the full tribute of applause for his humanity. If the trade in slaves could be abolished, it would be the most complete remedy; but I doubt the practicability of abolishing it. And where a disease cannot

be eradicated, a cautious physician will have recourse to palliatives. Mr. Wilberforce has stated the horrible sufferings of the slaves, from the manner in which the trade is now carried on. He will recollect, that these sufferings have occurred since the trade has been carried on by contraband. I believe these enormities did not happen while the commerce was carried on under the direction of the several governments. The increase of suffering by the Negroes thus transported, must therefore be considered as a calamity which has arisen from the attempt to abolish the slave-trade. I will not enlarge on the money already expended by Great Britain to effect the abolition: if all the various modes of expense are considered, they will be found to amount to a sum, which, in the present state of this country, oppressed as it is by immoderate taxation, every man must regret.

Mr. Wilberforce now proposes a new remedy; that the British government should prevail on other nations to consent to a mutual right of search. I believe the

British ministers will not succeed in this attempt; and if they did succeed, I think they would give occasion to constant quarrels among the various nations of the earth. No qualifications could be introduced which could prevent injustice and consequent dispute. Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands appear unwilling to abolish the trade. It is not probable, therefore, that they will consent to such a right of search. The inhabitants of the United States of America, appear willing to abolish the trade; but they revolt at the proposal of search; and when we consider what acts of injustice they have experienced from the abusive exercise of the search for the *contrebande de guerre*, it is not probable that they will ever consent to establish a new ground for search. The French are friendly to the abolition; but those members of the French Chamber of Deputies, who are most desirous of the abolition of the trade, abhor the proposal of a right of search. The establishment of such a right would be productive of wars, and destructive of the happiness of mankind. It has been suggested, that as Portugal appears to be the state most averse to the

abolition of the slave-trade, other nations should break off their commercial relations with that country. I hope that this measure will not be adopted: it must necessarily produce war; and war is not the means by which nations should be brought to abolish the slave-trade.

I am aware, that he who proposes that we should relinquish the attempt of abolishing the slave-trade will expose himself to much reproach; for the numerous partisans of the abolition have heated themselves on the subject; but when Mr. Wilberforce declares that the abolition of the slave-trade cannot be effected, except the different governments will consent to a mutual right of search, and it is known that the different governments will not submit to this right of search, are we not arrived at this point, that we cannot hope to cure the disease, without adopting a remedy which cannot be resorted to?

I will add but one remark more on the subject of the slave-trade. From the time that we adopted the plan of abolishing the

trade, we have, in a great degree, relinquished every idea of ameliorating the condition of the Negroes already resident in the islands. I regret this; for the condition of the slaves in the islands is susceptible of amelioration. I think every negro should be *glebæ ascriptus*, and not alienable, but with the estate: this would add much to the comfort of the slave. He would have a permanently fixed home, to which he could always look up for comfort; since it would be extremely reasonable, that the owner of the plantation should be obliged to maintain the Negro when worn out by age or sickness; and the slave would no longer be liable to be torn from his nearest connexions, under a writ of execution, enforced by a judgment-creditor. Various other means might also be suggested for improving the condition of those Negroes who are already in the islands.

I cannot say that I wish to see the mutual right of search established. The abusive exercise of the right of search *pour la contrebande de guerre*, and the extension of the law of blockade, have already produced

a war between Great Britain and the United States of America. Let not the causes of war between nations be multiplied. When Sir William Temple negotiated the commercial treaty with Holland in 1668, the Dutch commissioners pressed him very much to consent to a change in that principle of the law of nations, that free ships should make free goods. They urged, that this change would be very advantageous to Great Britain; for that, although Holland possessed at that time the superior power at sea, yet it was manifest that the superiority would soon be transferred to Great Britain, and that she would reap all the advantage from this change in the law of nations. Sir William Temple resisted the proposal. He would not consent to a change which he saw would necessarily expose the weaker states to be oppressed by the more powerful. I know that at present a wish prevails among several states, that the law of nations in this respect should be changed, and that free ships should no longer make free goods; each state relying that its maritime power would enable it to derive

advantage from the alteration. But Sir William Temple was the wisest statesman of his day, and I think that he decided judiciously on this question. Let it not be supposed that I am a friend to Negro slavery; but I regret that we have abandoned the practicable measure of ameliorating the condition of the slaves, for the hopeless attempt to abolish the trade.

NOTE 24. — Page 309.

I have said that the civil wars of York and Lancaster occasioned many serfs to be enfranchised, the lords having occasion for them as soldiers. Probably the crusades had produced similar effects.

We find this enactment in Magna Charta: *Hæredes ne disparagentur.* Probably the disparagement which was most frequent, and most injurious, and which the statute chiefly intended to provide against, was this: the feudal lord married his female ward to one of his villeins. By this marriage, the

villein immediately acquired an estate in fee in right of his wife, determinable by her death; and this interest was instantly vested in the lord. If there was issue of the marriage, the fee-simple vested in that issue, on the death of the father and mother; and as that issue was villein, the absolute fee-simple became vested in the lord. We find from the historians of that time, that this method of acquiring property was much employed by ecclesiastical lords; for in the 17th of Richard II. the Commons prayed, that remedy might be had against such religious persons as cause their villeins to marry free women inheritable, whereby the estates come to those religious persons by collusion.

NOTE 25. — Page 310.

It is not probable that leases for 99 years, determinable on lives, were much in use before the enactment of that statute of 21st Henry VIII. cap. 15. which authorized the lessee for years to falsify a common recovery, as far as it regarded his own lease;

for, antecedently to that statute, the lease for years could at any time be destroyed by the lessor; for example, A. had leased to B. for years. A. then suffered a common recovery to C. By this recovery C. was supposed to have a better title than A., but if a better, then an older title; for in title, *qui prior est tempore, potior est jure;* but if C. had an older title than A. the lessor, it followed as a consequence, that C. had an older title than B. who claimed under A., and B.'s lease therefore could not be set up against C. I apprehend that it was this circumstance, of the interest of the lessee for years being at the mercy of the lessor, which rendered a lease, even for 1000 years, of less estimation at the common law than a freehold, though only for life. The statute of Gloucester, 6th Edward I., statute 1st, cap. 11., had attempted an ineffectual remedy of this abuse; but the possession of the lease was not completely secured to the termor till the 21st Henry VIII. cap. 15. If this reasoning is correct, those estates which have since been leases for 99 years, determinable on lives, were probably, antecedently to the statute 21st

Henry VIII. cap. 15., estates held by copy of court-roll.

The statute of Merton, 20th Henry III., allowed lords of manors to inclose parts of their wastes, provided they left sufficient for the commonage of their tenants. This inclosure received the name of *approvement*. But I believe the usual inclosure under this act in ancient times was not a permanent inclosure, but rather resembled what the farmers call a hitch crop; that is to say, the lord allowed his tenant to inclose part of the waste for a few years, during which he might crop it for corn, and then throw it open again to the waste. I am led to be of this opinion, from observing that in almost every common which I have seen there are marks, that, at some time or other, parts of the common have been ploughed. There seem to have been four component parts of every manor. First, the demesnes of the lord. Secondly, lands granted to freemen to be held freely to them and their heirs, by fealty and other services. Thirdly, lands occupied by serfs at the will of the lord, afterwards granted to the same per-

sons to be held by copy of court-roll. Fourthly, common or waste, into which the lord, the free tenants, and the serfs, or copy-holders, all indiscriminately turned their cattle. These commons were the necessary consequence of the population of the country not being adequate to its cultivation. And this defect of population was the consequence of the Saxons having extirpated or exterminated the Britons. Perhaps the continual wars which prevailed during the Heptarchy contributed to increase the evil.

It has been the fashion to suppose, that the refusal of the earls and barons in the statute of Merton, 20th Henry III., to permit children born before marriage to be considered as legitimated by the subsequent marriage, arose from the love of virtue in our ancestors. The circumstances are thus transmitted to us by our historians. "*Rogarunt omnes episcopi magnates, ut nati post matrimonium essent legitimi, sicut qui nati sunt in matrimonio: et omnes comites et barones unâ voce responderunt, Nolumus*

leges Angliæ mutari, quæ hucusque usitatæ atque approbatæ sunt."

I rather suspect that this is a vulgar error, and that their resistance to the request of the bishops, proceeded more from their solicitude to preserve their feudal profits, than from any pre-eminent attention to the chastity of women. At that time land was not devisable by will. Escheats therefore, for want of heirs must have been very common; but if the feudal tenant could by a marriage a little before his death, not only deprive the lord of his escheat, but perhaps also bring forward an heir of full age, the lord would frequently have lost not only his escheat, but also wardship, marriage, and almost all his feudal emoluments. When we consider the habits of our ancestors at that time, that the day was chiefly spent in the sports of the field, and the evening in gluttony and drunkenness, I cannot help suspecting, that attention to their feudal profits had more influence on them than morality.

Note 26.—Page 344.

Dr. Florence Hensey, an Irish Catholic, physician to the Spanish anbassador, sent intelligence to the French government, that the secret expedition of 1757 was intended against Rochefort. For sending this intelligence, he was found guilty of high treason, but pardoned. The French seem to have paid this spy very miserably, they gave him at first only 100*l.* a year; afterwards on his representing, that if they would increase his salary, he could keep better company, and by that means obtain more important intelligence, they raised his allowance to 150*l.* a year.

Note. 27.—Page 348.

There is a character given by Tacitus, of Domitius Corbulo, which I have often thought applicable to Lord Thurlow. The words are these: "*Corpore ingens, verbis magnificus; et præter experientiam sapientiamque, etiam specie inanium validus.*"

Note 28. — Page 378.

The vassal, by breach of his allegiance, forfeited for his heirs as well as for himself: by analogy, it was reasonable that the feudal lord should forfeit for his heirs in the same manner; for *tantum debet dominus vasallo, quantum vasallus domino, præter solam reverentiam.* And feudal writers state this to have been the law. Bracton, who wrote in the reign of Henry III., has this expression: "*Et rex sub lege, quia lex facit regem.*"

Note 29. — Page 401.

It is not surprising that the French Revolution should have occasioned much alarm to the several kings of Europe; more especially to German kings, whose sovereign power was considered by themselves not as magistracy, but as property. George III., from an early period of his reign, had shown how deeply he was impressed with these sentiments of a German Prince. The British colonies in America had been

founded on principles of civil and religious liberty: from this circumstance the sentiments of the inhabitants, and even the forms of many of their governments, savoured much of republicanism. Hatred to these principles of liberty led him to pursue, with unremitting obstinacy, his designs of depriving them of their privileges. It is somewhat curious that the Roman historian, Livy, puts into the mouth of Tarquin's ambassadors to Porsena, king of the Etrurians, sentiments similar to those which influenced the kings of Europe to commence their crusade against French principles.

"Monebant etiam, ne orientem morem pellendi reges inultum sineret. Satis libertatem ipsam habere dulcedinis; nisi quantâ vi civitates eam expetant, tantâ, regna reges defendant, æquari summa infinis, nihil excelsum, nihil quod supra cetera emineat, in civitatibus fore. Adesse finem regnis, rei inter deos hominesque pulcherrimæ."

Note 30. — Page 406.

The enmity of Sweden was not the only injurious consequence which followed from the seizure of Bremen, and Verden; to give the semblance of a legal title to his possession, it was necessary that George I. should obtain the investiture of those duchies from the Emperor: this was the object of all his negotiations at Vienna, during the remainder of his reign; to the hope of obtaining this investiture, he sacrificed every other consideration, and showed the most implicit obedience to all the wishes of the House of Austria. But the ministers of that court knew the importance of the boon; they therefore only fed George I. with the hopes; and the investiture was not obtained till after the accession of George II.

I WILL now close these Recollections and Reflections. The sentiments which I have wished to impress are these:—First, that immoderate taxation is the grievance by which the country is oppressed; that this immoderate taxation has been the result of the unnecessary wars in which the nation has been involved during the reign of George III., and has been carried to such an excess, that it checks and impedes the creative industry of the people. Either the expenses of the government must be diminished, or a portion of the dividends must be withheld from the public creditor. Secondly, that this retrenchment cannot be effected without a reform of the House of Commons; inasmuch as wasteful expenditure is necessary, to enable the minister to regulate and controul this most expensive machinery. The Stuarts were expelled, because they abused the power confided to them. The House of Commons will be reformed from a similar cause, viz. because it has abused that power of taxing which has been confided to it by the

Constitution. One other sentiment Englishmen should keep in mind; it is this, — that our government is, by the principles of our constitution, a civil government; but that there are certain persons who, during the reign of George III., have endeavoured to change it into a military government. This system cannot be persevered in; a German military, united to English profusion, is beyond what can be supported by the most active industry of the people; and when Englishmen are deprived of the enjoyment of those principles of civil liberty in which they have been accustomed to delight, their energies will cease.

SINCE this edition was sent to the press, a debate has occurred in the House of Commons, which must attract the attention of every Englishman who reflects on the situation of his country. The debate to which I allude, was that which took place on the 13th of March, on the motion of Lord Normanby; viz. "That the House should resolve, that it is the opinion of this House, that, without detriment to the public service, the duties of Postmaster-general may be performed by one officer, and that the salary of the other may be saved." This motion was met by all the ministers, openly and undisguisedly. They said very little of the services to be performed by the second Postmaster. But they explicitly avowed, that they would not permit the influence of the Crown to be diminished piecemeal. They said that the influence of the Crown was necessary, to enable the ministers to carry on the business of the public; that there always was in the House of Commons a number of members desirous of driving the ministers from office, that their opponents might become the ministers in their

stead, and that it was necessary, that the ministers in possession should have a body of members sufficient to support them. I do not mean to dispute the truth of this assertion, — that there are always in the House of Commons members whose sole object it is to drive ministers from their offices; and that they are actuated by the hope of being the ministers themselves. But they advanced another doctrine, to which I must enter a negative. They contended, that if ministers were deprived of the support of those members whom they could influence by their patronage, the powers of royalty would be sunk to nothing, and our Constitution would instantly become republican. I deny the truth of this assertion. I have remarked, in a former reflection, that the Brunswick family was called to the throne by the Act of Settlement; and that, correctly speaking, they have no right to any magistracy, but such as was limited to them by that statute, although the provisions of that statute might be varied by subsequent Acts of Parliament. Those who framed the Act of Settlement certainly had no idea, that the person to whom they were

about to limit the succession to the Crown should depend for his continuance in power on the support of placemen and pensioners in the House of Commons. It is impossible that they could have entertained this idea, when we consider the words which they have used in the statute: the words are these: — "That no person who has an office or place of profit under the King, or receives a pension from the Crown, shall be capable of serving as a member of the House of Commons." Let any man consider these expressions attentively, and then let him ask himself whether he really believes, that those who framed the Act of Settlement intended, that the King should depend for the continuance of his authority on the support of pensioners and placemen. In the debate on the 13th of March, those members who defend the measures of Government in the House of Commons contended, that they were defending the powers of the King; but in this they were practising a deception. The prerogatives of royalty and the splendour of the King are not the objects for which they are contending: if these were their objects, why are they so ready to give

up 30,000*l.* a-year of the King's privy purse, while they are so pertinaciously struggling to prevent 2500*l.* a-year from being taken from their own patronage. They bring forward the name of the King, because they are sensible that the people of England are attached to royalty; but the real sovereigns, whose power they are anxious to preserve, are the proprietors and patrons of boroughs. It is with these men, who have usurped a power in defiance of the law of England, that the people of England have to contend. Whether these men place their members in the opposition-camp, or among the ministerial ranks, they are equally the enemies of the people of England. It is with them that the people are to contend: Reformers and Anti-reformers are the real names of the respective parties. The machinery of the House of Commons cannot be conducted without the present waste of public money. Nay, more, as there is much truth in that French proverb, *L'apetit croit en mangeant;* those who draw their opulence from the profuse expenditure of public money must every day be increasing in their demands. Immoderate taxation

has created the misery of the people. Few or none possess affluence but those who draw their wealth from the public taxes. These are the parties: the payers of taxes on the one side, and the receivers of emoluments out of the taxes on the other. The great mass of the people are in a state of misery; but the ministers and their adherents will not believe this. On the contrary, they say, "The machine works well." They call every man a Radical who desires the reform of the House of Commons; and intimate, that this radical wishes for a republic. I avow myself to be a Reformer; and if the supporters of corruption choose to call me a Republican, they are welcome to do it. But when I say I am a Reformer, I beg that it may be understood, that I am not an advocate for universal suffrage. I desire nothing more than to see a House of Commons ready to protect the property of the people, and the free principles of our constitution; — in one word, such a House of Commons as those men, who framed the Act of Settlement, had in their contemplation.

I will add but one reflection more on this subject. The language of the ministers on the 13th of March did not drop from them incautiously, and in the heat of a debate: it was the language of premeditation, deliberately set up as a barrier to every proposal for the diminution of their patronage. The ministers of the Stuarts claimed that they had a right to impose taxes by the authority of the King alone. Those who knew and loved the English constitution resisted this claim. They said, that no taxes could be imposed on the people of England but by their own consent, and that this assent was to be announced by their representatives in the House of Commons. The Stuart dynasty perished in the contest. If the ministers of the Brunswicks can establish that doctrine which they thus undisguisedly advanced, they will effectually obtain the object which was unsuccessfully struggled for by the Stuarts, and they will obtain it in a manner still more injurious to the people; for the machinery of the House of Commons, (under which expression I include the expense of maintaining in-

fluence in the several boroughs, as well as the patronage distributed to the members of the House and their relations,) will be an additional burden on the people. The ministers will also avoid the odium of imposing taxes, while those taxes appear to be imposed by the representatives of the people. But the die is cast; the ministers have passed the Rubicon: either the House of Commons must be so reformed as to enable it to protect the people from immoderate taxation, or despotism must henceforth be the government of England.

THE END.

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